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Abstract
This paper shows how a theory-consistent demand system can be used to quantify recipient 
welfare under in-kind and cash transfers. Since welfare under an in-kind subsidy depends 
on the extent to which the transfer is extra-marginal, I compute the shadow prices at which 
a recipient would be as well off as with the in-kind transfer. Shadow prices are then used to 
compute the distribution of the willingness to pay for in-kind benefi ts among benefi ciaries. 
As an application of this approach, I study the welfare effects of a governmental program 
which randomly transferred either a food basket or cash to poor households in rural Mexico. 
Results suggest that on average a recipient values the in-kind transfer at 80 percent of its 
face value. Despite the welfare loss, the in-kind transfer is more cost-effi cient than cash. 
This is due to the fact that the food basket was signifi cantly more expensive at the retail 
level than at the procurement level, which implies that a cash transfer of the same cost to 
the government could only buy a fraction of the food basket in recipient’s local markets. 
Because the food basket is mainly formed of normal goods, I also fi nd that the willingness to 
pay is larger among recipients at the top of the income distribution, suggesting a regressive 
effect of the in-kind transfer.
Keywords: in-kind transfers, cash transfers, demand system, welfare.
JEL classifi cation: D61, H23, H43, I38, 022.
Resumen
Este artículo muestra cómo modelos de demanda pueden utilizarse para cuantifi car los 
efectos de transferencias en especie y en efectivo sobre el bienestar de los benefi ciarios. La 
metodología propuesta se basa en calcular los «precios virtuales» que garantizarían el mismo 
nivel de bienestar que una transferencia en especie y a partir de los cuales es posible construir 
la distribución de la propensión al pago por la transferencia entre los benefi ciarios. Como 
ejemplo de dicha metodología, el artículo estudia un programa que transfi rió, de manera 
aleatoria, transferencias en especie o en efectivo a hogares en pueblos rurales de México. 
Los resultados sugieren que la propensión al pago de los benefi ciarios por la transferencia 
en especie es cercana al 80 % de su valor de mercado. A pesar de dicha distorsión, la 
transferencia en especie resulta más efi ciente que una transferencia en efectivo de igual coste. 
Esto se debe a una diferencia signifi cativa entre el coste al por mayor de la transferencia y su 
coste al por menor, lo cual sugiere que una transferencia en efectivo de igual coste solo sería 
sufi ciente para comprar una parte de la transferencia en especie. Además, el artículo muestra 
que transferencias en especie pueden tener efectos regresivos, ya que la propensión al pago 
resulta mayor entre hogares con rentas más elevadas.
Palabras clave: transferencias en especie, transferencias en efectivo, modelos de demanda, 
economía del bienestar.
Códigos JEL: D61, H23, H43, I38, 022.
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1 Introduction
More than 1.5 billion people in the developing world are recipients of social pro-
tection programs whose benefits are delivered either in-kind or in-cash (Honorati et
al., 2015). Yet few empirical tools exist which are able to quantify the welfare im-
plications of one transfer scheme against another. Because in-kind transfers are not
fungible, they are typically associated with potential welfare losses as compared to
cash-equivalent transfers. Moreover, they usually have larger administrative costs
as compared to cash (Hidrobo et al., 2014). Despite this criticism, in markets that
are not well-integrated in-kind transfers might be more cost-efficient than cash. If
the economies of scale from procuring goods in wholesale markets are large enough
to compensate for the additional distribution costs, the recipient’s welfare gains un-
der a transfer in-kind might surprisingly be larger than under a cash transfer of
the same cost.1 Therefore, determining which policy generates the largest welfare
gains at a given cost to the policy maker requires an empirical model which is able
to quantify how much an in-kind transfer is actually worth to a recipient.
This paper proposes a novel approach to compute the welfare effects of in-kind
transfers, and to assess their relative efficiency with respect to cash transfers. Wel-
fare analysis in the presence of an in-kind subsidy is not straightforward for several
reasons. First, recipients might substitute goods that they usually consume with the
subsidized goods. Therefore, accounting for the substitution possibilities requires
estimating a demand system for both subsidized and non-subsidized goods. Second,
the welfare effects depend on whether the in-kind transfer is infra-marginal or extra-
marginal for a given recipient. For recipients that would reduce their purchases
one-to-one with the subsidized goods (i.e., if the in-kind transfer is infra-marginal),
welfare would coincide with that of an equal-value cash transfer. Instead, an extra-
marginal in-kind transfer increases recipient’s consumption of the subsidized goods
1Margolies and Hoddinott (2015) compare the costs of two recent programs which delivered
food or cash assistance to targeted households in Ecuador and Yemen. They found that, in Yemen,
the cost of procuring a food basket worth US$ 49 at local market prices was approximately US$ 39.
As a result, the per-transfer cost of food was lower than the per-transfer cost of cash, even when
accounting for the larger logistic and distribution costs of the food aid. While this was not true for
the program in Ecuador, large differences in the procurement and retail prices of food have been
documented in Kenya (ACF, 2012) and in the Gaza Strip (Creti, 2011).
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by more than a cash-equivalent transfer. However, this “distortionary effect” on the
budget allocation of the recipient can not be directly ascribed to observed changes
to income or prices within a demand system.
To overcome this issue, I use an estimated demand system to compute the vir-
tual prices of the subsidized goods at which a consumer would be as well off as
he would be with the in-kind transfer. Virtual prices are then used to construct a
money metric utility measure.2 Given variation in recipient’s income, demographic
characteristics and in the relative prices, virtual prices can be computed at the indi-
vidual level, which allows to construct the distribution of the welfare effects within
the population of recipients.
As an application of the proposed approach, I study the Programa de Apoyo
Alimentario (PAL), a governmental program providing monthly baskets of food
to poor households in rural Mexico. The basket subsidized by the government
includes both common staples within the Mexican diet (e.g., rice, beans) and other
less frequently consumed foodstuffs (e.g., breakfast cereals, canned fish). As a
result of transferring some commodities that beneficiaries do not usually consume
- a choice which stems essentially from paternalistic motives - the transfer might
thus imply large welfare losses among program beneficiaries.
There are several reasons which make the PAL program a particularly suitable
setting to assess the efficiency of in-kind transfers relative to cash transfers. First,
pre and post intervention surveys (among approximately 5,400 households in 200
villages) collected extensive data about household consumption and expenditure
for a large variety of food commodities, including those transferred in-kind. In
addition, information about the prices of these commodities were obtained through
surveys of local shops.
Second, the evaluation of the program relies on an experimental trial in which
eligible villages were randomly assigned to an in-kind treatment arm, to a cash
treatment arm, or to a control group. The experimental design of the program allows
me to conduct powerful tests of the model’s validity. In particular, after estimating
a quadratic almost ideal demand system (QUAIDS, Banks et al., 1997) on a sample
2Virtual prices were first developed by Neary and Roberts (1980) in the context of rationing
constraints.
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of baseline households only, I show that the model can replicate extremely well
the observed changes in the consumption patterns of households receiving the cash
transfer program.
Third, in the context of PAL there is a substantial difference in the costs of the
two transfer schemes, which makes the determination of the most efficient transfer
modality a non trivial exercise. The value of the cash transfer was set so to equalize
the purchasing cost of the food basket in wholesale markets. However, price data
reveal that the food basket was approximately 37 percent more expensive at the lo-
cal level, which implies that the face value of the in-kind transfer was larger than
the value of the cash transfer. In addition, the administrative costs of the two trans-
fer modalities have been documented by previous evaluations of the PAL program
(Ventura-Alfaro et al., 2011). Although, not surprisingly, these were larger for the
in-kind subsidy, the total cost per-dollar of the in-kind transfer is lower than the
total cost per-dollar of cash. Therefore, which policy generates the larger welfare
gains at a given cost to the government depends on the size of the welfare loss of the
transfer in-kind relative to the difference in the costs of the two transfer modalities.
Results suggest that the efficiency loss of the in-kind transfer was relatively
large: on average, recipients valued the transfer at approximately 80 percent of its
face value. However, for most recipients the magnitude of the welfare loss is not
large enough to outweigh the difference in the face value of the in-kind versus the
cash transfer. As a result, approximately 65 percent of targeted households would
prefer the in-kind transfer to the cash transfer. The welfare analysis also suggests
the existence of substantial heterogeneity in the welfare effects, which reflects both
variation in the prices of the food basket across villages and different characteristics
of the recipients. Another important result of this paper is the fact that the transfer
in-kind is found to be regressive: the willingness to pay for the in-kind transfer
is larger among households at the top of the income distribution. Intuitively, an in-
kind transfer benefits proportionally more those recipients with higher consumption
levels of the subsidized goods. Since estimated price elasticities for PAL commodi-
ties suggest that these are on average normal goods, the welfare gains of the in-kind
subsidy are larger among relatively better-off recipients.
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fare changes under different assumptions about the general equilibrium effects of
the program. In a recent paper, Cunha et al. (2018) provide evidence that the PAL
program, by increasing the supply of the subsidized goods, caused a modest but
significant reduction in the local prices of PAL goods. When I simulate a change
in the price of the subsidized commodities which is in line with the estimated price
effect in their paper, I find that consumer’s welfare increases as compared to a sce-
nario with constant prices. This is consistent with the fact that households pay lower
prices for out-of-pocket purchases of the subsidized goods. However, price changes
might imply redistribution from producers to consumers. Given the lack of data on
the supply side of the market, this paper only provides a partial equilibrium analysis
by quantifying the effects on consumer’s welfare.
This paper is mainly related to a large literature studying the effects of in-kind
versus cash transfer programs, to which it contributes in several ways. First, I de-
velop a flexible procedure to quantify the welfare effects of an in-kind subsidy
program. Other studies in the literature focused on the estimation of the cash-
equivalent value of the well-known Food Stamp Program in the US by exploiting
a cash-out policy of the program (Moffit, 1989; Whitmore, 2002).3From a method-
ological point of view, the closest study to this paper is Schwab (1985), who used
virtual prices in order to compute the value of a housing benefit program. In his
paper, Schwab (1985) provides an application in which only one good (housing) is
subsidized in-kind. Moreover, he made the restrictive assumption that the demand
of the non-subsidized goods is of the constant elasticity form, which allows to es-
timate the demand of housing only. My work generalizes this approach by using
state of the art techniques in the estimation of demand systems in order to model
the demand of multiple subsidized goods as well as the demand of non-subsidized
goods. This is particularly important in many settings, such as the application pre-
sented here in which modeling the demand of food requires taking into account the
substitutability between subsidized and non-subsidized foods.
3Moffit (1989) estimated a piecewise-linear constraint model, finding that the food stamps were
equivalent to cash, mostly because the majority of beneficiaries were infra-marginal and partly be-
cause of potential trafficking of the vouchers. Whitmore (2002) developed a theoretical model which
she used to estimate the distorting effect of the voucher. Her findings suggest that the beneficiaries
valued the vouchers at approximately 80 percent of their face value.
The estimated model of demand can also be used to study how household wel-
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Second, to my knowledge this is the first paper to structurally estimate the wel-
fare effects of a food assistance programs in a developing country. The findings
from the above mentioned studies which estimated the value of the Food Stamp pro-
gram might not be generalized to developing countries since food stamps - which
give recipients freedom on how to spend the voucher on many different foodstuffs
- are less restrictive than many food assistance programs in developing countries,
which typically entail the direct provision of food. Moreover, food represents a
much larger fraction of the budget of the poor in developing countries than it is for
the poor in developed countries. Finally, as food voucher programs are typically
spent by recipients at the retail level, they can not be used by policy makers to take
advantage of lower prices at the wholesale level. For all these reasons, the size and
even the direction of the welfare effects of food transfer programs in the developing
world might not be comparable to those of existing studies in the literature.
Third, I focus on the heterogeneity of the welfare effects across recipients, doc-
umenting a regressive effect of the in-kind transfer. This is a relevant result for
the policy debate, as it suggests that food transfers might not be well-targeted, es-
pecially in a context in which most of the population is poor and take-up of the
program is high.
One additional contribution of this paper is to study one channel that could jus-
tify the use of in-kind transfers over cash transfers, namely the existence of differ-
ences between the procurement and the retail prices of the subsidized commodities.
This is of considerable importance as it has efficiency implications, but it has re-
ceived relatively little attention in the literature. Among the other justifications for
the provision of in-kind transfers instead of cash, the most cited reason is pater-
nalism: a paternalistic donor usually wants to induce higher consumption of some
merit goods, either because there are externalities from the consumption of these
goods (Garfinkel, 1973) or because it believes that recipients might spend cash on
non-desirable goods, such as alcohol or tobacco. In-kind transfers might also be
used as a screening device to induce the non-poor to self-select out of a transfer
scheme (Nichols and Zeckhauser, 1982; Blackorby and Donaldson, 1988; Gahvari
and Mattos, 2007). Implicit in this argument is the idea that in-kind transfers are
not as appealing to the rich as cash, either because of the low-quality of the in-kind
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 12 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1850
bundle or because of stigma effects (Moffit, 1983). Other suggested reasons in favor
of the provision of in-kind transfers point to lower adverse effects on labor supply,
as compared to cash transfers (Fraker and Moffit, 1988; Hoynes and Schanzenbach,
2012); or to the possibility of lowering the price of some target good by increasing
its supply, potentially achieving redistribution from producers to consumers (Coate
et al., 1994; Cunha et al., 2018).4
In the context of the PAL program, the most rigorous evaluation has been con-
ducted by Cunha (2014). The focus of his paper is to test the paternalistic justi-
fication of the program and, to this aim, he exploits the randomized design of the
program to compare the consumption patterns and health outcomes of in-kind and
cash recipients. While the reduced form estimates in Cunha (2014) provide evi-
dence that the in-kind transfer shifted household budget composition towards the
subsidized goods, quantifying the size of the implied welfare loss of the transfer
requires the structural estimation of a model of demand. This paper addresses this
gap and proposes a flexible tool to compute the differential effects of these two
policies on the welfare of the recipients. It is worth noting that the main conclu-
sions of the paper by Cunha (2014) are also instrumental to the analysis presented
here. As the author does not find substantial differences in the health of cash and
in-kind recipients - another dimension of interest to policy makers when choosing
among different transfer modalities, this paper focuses only on the comparison of
the welfare implications of these two policies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical
framework for household choice under cash and in-kind transfers, and a formal
definition of virtual prices in the context of an in-kind transfer program. Section
3 describes the PAL program and the data. Section 4 presents the demand system
and discusses the estimation strategy. Section 5 describes the procedure used to
quantify the welfare effects of a a transfer in-kind. Section 6 reports results from
the estimation of the demand system, while Section 7 shows results from the welfare
analysis. Section 8 concludes.
4See Currie and Gahvari (2008) for a review of the literature.
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2 Theoretical framework
2.1 Choice under cash and in-kind transfers
Suppose that a consumer has preferences over two goods, y and z, whose prices are
respectively py and pz . A government can either provide an in-kind subsidy qz,
for which it pays a procurement price p¯z, or provide an equal-cost cash transfer,
x¯ = p¯zq¯z. Figure 1 shows the traditional theory of choice under cash and in-kind
transfers in two different scenarios. In both cases, the pre-transfer budget set is
given by AB.
In the first scenario, depicted in Figure 1a, the price paid by the consumer to
buy good z coincides with the procurement price p¯z paid by the government. In this
case, the face value of the in-kind transfer is equal to the value of the cash trans-
fer. The transfer in-kind shifts the budget set to CEB, if no resale is possible; or to
CEF , if the resale price is lower than the market price. The budget set under the
cash transfer is given by CD. The indifference curves in Figure 1a show the prefer-
ences of two types of consumers. Consumer I would move from I to I′ under both
transfers, consuming more of the subsidized good than what is provided in-kind by
the government. In other words, the in-kind transfer is infra-marginal for consumer
I. On the contrary, the in-kind transfer is clearly extra-marginal for consumer II:
while the consumer would move to II′ under a cash transfer, consuming less than
qz, with an in-kind transfer he would move to the kink point E (if resale is not pos-
sible) or to II′′ (if resale is possible but costly). This implies that a consumer always
(weakly) prefers an equal-value cash transfer over an in-kind transfer.
It is important to remark that the extra-marginality of the in-kind transfer is
defined over the counterfactual consumption of the subsidized good under an equal-
value cash transfer, rather than over the pre-transfer consumption. Even though the
household pre-transfer consumption of the subsidized good might be strictly lower
than z, if the income elasticity of the good is sufficiently large the consumer might
consume a quantity qz ≥ qz after receiving an equal-value cash transfer. As I will
explain in Section 5, this distinction is important since it motivates the procedure
that I use to compute the welfare effects of a transfer in-kind.
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(a) p¯z = pz (b) p¯z < pz
Figure 1: Choice under cash and in-kind transfers
In the second scenario, depicted in Figure 1b, the price paid by the consumer
is larger than the procurement price paid by the government, i.e. pz > p¯z. In such
a case, the in-kind transfer is worth more at face value than the cash transfer, i.e.
x¯ < p¯zq¯z. The in-kind transfer still shifts the budget constraint to CEB (assuming
no reselling of the subsidized good), while the cash transfer shifts it to FG. As it
is apparent from Figure 1b, in this case there is no dominant transfer: a consumer
with indifference curves denoted with III is better off with the in-kind transfer,
while consumer IV prefers the cash transfer over the in-kind subsidy.
2.2 Virtual price for the subsidized goods
In this section, I extend the two-goods economy presented above to an economy
with multiple goods and show how virtual prices can be used to compute con-
sumer’s welfare under an in-kind transfer.5 Let qz be the vector of goods subsi-
dized in-kind by a government and qy be the vector of goods that the consumer
can only buy in the market. Denote with py and pz the vector of prices associated
5This section is largely based on Neary and Roberts (1980)’s and Deaton (1981)’s original works
about the theory of choice under rationing. A similar framework also appears in Schwab (1985).
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sume that the consumer has a well-defined preference ordering over (qy,qz), which
can be represented by a strictly quasi-concave, differentiable and increasing utility
function u(qy,qz).
Without an in-kind transfer scheme, the “unrestricted” optimization problem of
the consumer amounts to minimize the expenditure on qy and qz for a given utility
level u,
e(py, pz,u) = min
qy,qz
{
pyqy+ pzqz : u(qy,qz)≥ u
}
. (1)
The solution to problem (1) gives the compensated “unrestricted” demands
qy(py, pz,u) and qz(py, pz,u).
Consider now a transfer scheme in which the government subsidizes a fixed
quantity q¯z . As discussed in Section 2.1, a consumer for which the subsidy is
infra-marginal optimally consumes q¯z and possibly complements the subsidy with
additional purchases of good z in the market. Denoting with u¯ the maximum utility
attainable under an infra-marginal in-kind transfer, we must have e(py, pz, u¯) = x+
pzq¯z. In other words, the income necessary to reach the utility level u¯ is equal to the
pre-transfer income of the consumer plus the market value of the in-kind transfer.
A consumer for which the transfer is extra-marginal would instead consume
qz = q¯z and allocate his income to buy qy. In other words, the “restricted” expendi-
ture minimization problem is given by
e˜(py,qz,u) = minqy
{
pyqy : u(qy,qz)≥ u
}
. (2)
Let q˜y = q˜y(py,qz,u) be the compensated “restricted” demand which solves (2)
and let u∗ be the highest utility attainable by this extra-marginal consumer. The
virtual price p∗z is defined as the price equalizing the solutions of problems (1) and
(2). In other words, the virtual price p∗z solves
qz = qz(py, p
∗
z ,u
∗)
q˜y(py,qz,u
∗) = qy(py, p∗z ,u
∗). (3)
with y and z, respectively, and with x the pre-transfer income of the consumer. I as-
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Given convexity and strict monotonicity of preferences, such a price always
exists (Neary and Roberts, 1980). In addition, strict quasi-concavity of the utility
function guarantees its uniqueness (Deaton, 1981). The virtual price can be used to
find how the restricted and unrestricted expenditure functions are related. We can
write
e(py, p∗z ,u
∗) = pyqy(py, p∗z ,u
∗)+ p∗z qz(py, p
∗
z ,u
∗)
= pyq˜y(py,qz,u
∗)+ p∗z q¯z
= e˜(py,qz,u
∗)+ p∗z q¯z
where, in the second line, I have used equations (3) and the last line follows
from the definition of the constrained expenditure function in (2). In order to write
the above expression in a more compact way, I define x∗ ≡ e(py, p∗z ,u∗) and use the
fact that e˜(py,qz,u
∗) = x. This implies that
x∗ = x+ p∗z q¯z. (4)
Equation (4) has a nice interpretation. It says that the income necessary to reach
the utility level u∗ for an “unrestricted” consumer given the price vectors py and
p∗z is equal to its pre-transfer income plus the in-kind transfer valued at the virtual
price p∗z . The term p∗z q¯z can thus be interpreted as the “virtual value” of the in-kind
transfer. Note that since the consumer would not have consumed qz = q¯z if he was
given an equal-value cash transfer, the value that he attaches to the transfer is indeed
lower than its market value, i.e. p∗z q¯z < pzq¯z.
In the application that I will present in Section 5, equations (3) and (4) are used
to compute the virtual prices of the subsidized goods. These equations ensure that
the utility attained by an unrestricted consumer given the price vectors py and p∗z
and income x∗ is the same utility of a consumer receiving an extra-marginal in-kind
transfer q¯z. As a result, the consumer’s utility from receiving the in-kind transfer
can be computed from an unrestricted indirect utility function evaluated at x∗, py
and p∗z .
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3 The PAL program and the data
3.1 Description of the PAL program and experiment
The Programa de Apoyo Alimentario (PAL) is an in-kind social assistance program
providing food baskets to poor households in rural villages of Mexico. Villages
are considered eligible if they have a population of less than 2,500 inhabitants,
are highly marginalized (according to the Census classification) and are not ben-
eficiaries of the other two major Mexican welfare programs, Liconsa and Oportu-
nidades.6Another necessary condition for eligibility requires the village to be ac-
cessible and close enough to a store managed by DICONSA, the governmental
agency in charge of administering the program and responsible for the distribution
and supply of the food baskets.7Within eligible villages, households scoring below
a means-test poverty threshold were offered the program.
The PAL program started to be phased-in at the end of 2003. Concurrent with
its nationwide implementation, 206 villages were randomly selected among the uni-
verse of eligible villages to participate in an experimental trial. Each village was
randomly assigned into one of three treatment groups: (i) 103 villages received
an in-kind transfer; (ii) 53 villages received a cash transfer; (iii) 50 villages were
assigned to a control group that received nothing.
Villages in the in-kind treatment group received a monthly allotment of ten com-
modities, which are reported in Table 1. Along with goods that are very common
in the Mexican diet (rice, beans, vegetable oil), the basket also includes several
commodities that are consumed less frequently (pasta soup, cookies) or very rarely
(cereals box, corn flour, lentils, canned fish, powdered milk). However, the fact that
a large fraction of the PAL basket is constituted by goods that households do not
usually consume might imply large welfare losses for recipients. To get a sense of
the extent of the extra-marginality of the transfer, the first and second columns of
6Liconsa is a subsidized milk program. Oportunidades (previously known as PROGRESA) is a
conditional cash transfer program. PAL villages were not included in Oportunidades because they
did not have close enough health facilities and/or schools to comply with the conditional require-
ments of the program.
7Accessibility is defined as the village being within 2.5 km from a road. Similarly, a village is
considered to be close to a DICONSA store if it within 2.5 km from it.
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Table 1 show respectively the monthly allotment of each good and the percentage
of households in the cash treatment arm whose post-transfer consumption is less
than the subsidized quantity.8 For five out of ten goods, more than 75 percent of
cash recipients consumed less than the subsidized quantity.
The rationale for choosing such a basket was to improve the nutritional status of
recipients by encouraging a more diversified diet. However, previous evaluations of
the program have not found significant improvements in the health outcomes of in-
kind and cash recipients (Cunha, 2014). This is important in that, in the absence of
a health externality which could support the paternalistic motive, transferring a food
basket instead of cash can be justified if the transfer in-kind is more cost-efficient.
Villages in the cash treatment arm received a monthly cash transfer of 150 pesos
(approximately US$ 13), which corresponds to the government purchasing cost of
the food basket in wholesale markets. However, because of a significant differential
between the wholesale and retail prices of the subsidized commodities, the food
basket was on average 37 percent more expensive when valued at local prices. The
last two columns of Table 1 report the mean and standard deviation of the market
value of each commodity in the food basket, computed using pre-program village-
level median unit values. As one can see, the average face value of the in-kind
transfer, about 205 pesos (US$ 18), is larger than the value of the cash transfer. It
is also worth noting that there is substantial variability in the value of the basket,
which reflects variation in the prices of PAL commodities across villages.
Compared to household’s income, both transfers were sizable: the in-kind trans-
fer represented, on average, 18 percent of household’s baseline food expenditure
and 11 percent of total expenditure. Similarly, the cash transfer represented 13 per-
cent of household’s baseline food expenditure and 8 percent of total expenditure.
8Assessing the extra-marginality of the in-kind transfer would require comparing the subsidy
with the quantity consumed under a cash-equivalent transfer. However, as discussed below, the
value of the cash transfer is lower than the face value of the in-kind transfer. Despite this, the
comparison in Table 1, which is reported only for descriptive purposes, is more informative than
comparing the subsidy with pre-transfer consumption.
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It is often stated that one of the main reasons for providing transfers in-kind is
to achieve self-targeting of recipients (Nichols and Zeckhauser, 1982; Blackorby
and Donaldson, 1988; Gahvari and Mattos, 2007) since governments might transfer
inferior or low-quality goods, or because there might exist stigma effects attached
to receiving subsidies in-kind (Moffit, 1983). In the context of PAL this seems of
little concern since program take-up was as high as 87 and 93 percent for recipients
of cash and in-kind transfers, respectively (see Appendix A1).
Table 1: PAL food commodities
Commodity Amount of the
transfer (kg)
Percentage of
cash recipients
with
consumption
lower than the
amount of the
transfer
Baseline average
value of the
transfer (pesos)
Baseline SD of
the value of the
transfer (pesos)
Beans 2 0.08 20.85 3.64
Vegetable oil 1 (lt) 0.09 10.47 0.93
Rice 2 0.26 13.03 4.50
Pasta soup 1.2 0.55 16.23 2.21
Cookies 1 0.55 18.72 5.03
Canned fish 0.6 0.77 16.31 6.04
Corn flour 3 0.80 15.95 8.03
Lentils 1 0.87 10.80 6.20
Cereals box 0.2 0.89 7.37 3.26
Powdered milk 1.92 0.90 75.45 60.25
Total 205.2 64.03
Notes: Calculations in column 2 are based on self-reported post-program consumption for house-
holds in the cash treatment group. Calculations in columns 3 and 4 use the pre-program median unit
value in a village and are based on 197 sample villages.
The transfers are not conditional on family size and, whenever possible, they are
given to a woman (the household head or the spouse of the head).9
9Similar to Oportunidades and other social welfare programs, the transfer was put in the hand
of women in order to improve their condition within the household. Attanasio and Lechene (2014)
found that Oportunidades changed the budget allocation of the household as a result of increased
women’s empowerment. Here, I abstract from the within-household allocation of resources since
the main objective of the paper is the estimation of welfare effects at the household level. However,
when using the model to make out-of-sample predictions about the effect of a cash transfer, the
change in the budget structure predicted by the model is extremely similar to the one observed in the
actual data.
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inally intended to be conditional on the attendance of monthly classes (platicas)
covering health, nutrition and hygiene related topics. In the experiment, all cash
villages and a random half of the in-kind villages also received the classes. The
remaining half of in-kind villages should have received a purely unconditional
transfer, although in practice classes were taught also in those in-kind villages that
should not have received them.10 This is potentially problematic since the classes
might impact the way households spend their budget or change their preferences
towards certain types of goods. However, this seems of little concern for two main
reasons. First, although the courses were meant to be a mandatory requirements
for the receipt of the transfer, session attendance was not enforced (Skoufias et al.,
2008). Self-reported data on session attendance indeed suggest that PAL recipients
only participated in about a third of the sessions that they were supposed to attend
(Appendix A1). Second, class exposure was significantly lower for the group of in-
kind villages randomized out of receiving the classes. Previous evaluations of the
program did not find evidence that exposure to the classes had any differential effect
on food consumption (Cunha, 2014), a result which is consistent with the lack of
enforcement of the conditionality requirement. For these reasons, I pool together
all in-kind villages and abstract from the effects of class attendance.
3.2 Data, sample and descriptive statistics
In each experimental village, about 33 households were randomly selected to par-
ticipate in a baseline survey (October 2003 to April 2004) and in an endline survey
(October 2005 to December 2005). The PAL transfer began to be delivered after
the completion of the baseline data collection. The household survey provides ex-
tensive information about consumption and expenditure of a large variety of food
commodities, elicited through a seven days recall. In addition to the household
survey, enumerators visited local shops in order to gather information about food
commodity prices. As information about prices is central in the estimation of a
10One of the objectives of the experimental design was to study the effect of information and
education classes over and above the effect of the in-kind transfer itself. Avitabile (2012) finds small
improvement in the health behavior of women in the in-kind plus education group as compared to
women in the in-kind group, but no effect for men.
One additional characteristic of the program is the fact that transfers were orig-
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demand system, I postpone the data description to section 4.2, where I discuss thor-
oughly the methodology adopted to construct commodity prices.
Of the 206 experimental villages, nine villages in which the program was not
correctly implemented are excluded from the analysis. Two villages started to re-
ceive PAL transfers prior to the baseline survey; two villages refused to participate
in the program; two villages were excluded from PAL for receiving Oportunidades;
and two villages received the wrong treatment (one control village received in-
kind benefits and one village received both cash and in-kind transfers). Finally, the
construction of village-level commodity prices requires geographical imputation of
missing prices at the municipality or state level. Since there is only one village from
the state of Quintana Roo, it is infeasible to construct prices for many commodities
in this village, and it is thus dropped from the analysis.
Within the remaining 197 sample villages, I do not use data from attrited house-
holds. The estimation sample is formed of 5,333 households observed in both
survey waves. Household attrition was low, being around 12 percent, but it was sig-
nificantly higher in control localities than in treatment localities and induced some
change in household composition (see Appendix A2). In the empirical analysis,
I take this into account by controlling for household characteristics. The implicit
assumption is that, conditional on demographic characteristics, attrition is random.
Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics for the sample of households, sepa-
rately for each treatment group. The average household is formed of five members
and has two children younger than twelve. Households are in general low-educated:
60 percent of the household heads have not finished primary school, and only 18
percent have a secondary school degree or higher. Around 14 percent of the sam-
ple is headed by a female and approximately 18 percent is formed by indigenous
households. The statistics in Table 2 confirm that the sample is poor: per capita
food expenditure is about 300 pesos per month (approximately US$ 27), while per
capita total expenditure is 480 pesos per month (approximately US$ 44). Overall,
almost 70 percent of the household budget is spent on food. The last two rows
of the table report some descriptive statistics for the sample of villages. Villages
are quite small, with a population of approximately 600 inhabitants.11 The average
11Information on the village population has been taken from the 2005 Census.
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value of the PAL basket, computed using pre-program village-level prices, is ap-
proximately 205 pesos. The last three columns of Table 2, showing the differences
in the relevant variable between one treatment group and another, suggest that the
sample is overall balanced across the three treatment arms in terms of household
and village-level characteristics.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics by treatment group
Control In-Kind Cash (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (2)-(3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Household members 4.82 4.65 4.60 -0.17 -0.22 0.05
(2.18) (2.13) (2.09) (0.16) (0.18) (0.16)
Children 0 to 5 0.75 0.69 0.67 -0.06 -0.08 0.02
(0.91) (0.88) (0.85) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Age of the head 44.59 45.15 45.47 0.56 0.88 -0.32
(14.74) (15.31) (15.44) (0.86) (0.95) (0.79)
Education of the head (years) 4.18 4.24 4.03 0.06 -0.15 0.22
(3.65) (3.66) (3.56) (0.23) (0.26) (0.23)
Head female 0.15 0.14 0.12 -0.02 -0.03* 0.02
(0.36) (0.34) (0.33) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Indigenous household 0.22 0.18 0.14 -0.04 -0.08 0.03
(0.41) (0.38) (0.35) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05)
Per capita food expenditure 317.18 293.95 299.25 -23.23 -17.93 -5.30
(220.99) (197.80) (246.71) (18.28) (19.38) (15.33)
Per capita total expenditure 505.66 468.36 477.77 -37.30 -27.89 -9.41
(375.52) (339.54) (361.83) (32.19) (34.21) (27.00)
Budget share of food 0.67 0.68 0.67 0.01 -0.00 0.01
(0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Value of PAL food basket 202.39 206.16 209.42 3.77 7.02 -3.26
(38.80) (70.17) (76.97) (9.57) (12.59) (13.45)
Village population 690.67 579.91 562.99 -110.77 -127.69 16.92
(575.06) (512.61) (500.94) (97.53) (109.93) (89.26)
N 1268 2679 1386
Notes: "Indigenous Household" is an indicator equal to one if at least one household member speaks
an indigenous language. Food expenditure includes an estimation of the value of home-produced
goods. Per capita food and total expenditures are expressed in pesos per month. The value of the
PAL food basket is computed using pre-program median unit values in the village. Numbers in
parentheses are standard errors, clustered at the village level, for the differences in columns (4) to
(6) and standard deviations elsewhere. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level,
respectively.
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4 The Model of Demand
4.1 QUAIDS
Household demand is estimated using a quadratic almost ideal demand system
(QUAIDS; Banks et al., 1997), which allows goods to be necessities at some in-
come levels and luxuries at others. 12 The functional form of the QUAIDS is
wi = αi+
N
∑
j=1
γi jln(p j)+βiln
(
x
a(p)
)
+
λi
b(p)
(
ln
(
x
a(p)
))2
+ui, (5)
i= 1, ...,N, where wi is the share of expenditure in commodity i; log(p j), for j=
1, ...,N, is the natural logarithm of the price of commodity j; x is total expenditure;
and ui is an error term. The terms a(p) and b(p) are price indices13 defined as
ln(a(p)) = α0+∑
k
αkln(pk)+
1
2∑j ∑k
γ jkln(p j)ln(pk)
b(p) =
N
∏
i=1
pβii .
The demand system can accommodate the inclusion of demographic character-
istics, which is done by assuming that the intercepts in each equation are linear
functions of a vector of control variables d, including a constant, αi = α
′
did.
Since the model gives a system of equations in which the commodity shares wi
sum up to one, the following adding-up restrictions must be imposed:
N
∑
i=1
αi = 1;
N
∑
i=1
βi = 0;
N
∑
i=1
γi j = 0, j = 1, ...,N;
N
∑
i=1
λi = 0. (6)
12The QUAIDS generalizes the well-known almost ideal demand system (AIDS; Deaton and
Muellbauer, 1980) by introducing quadratic effects in total expenditure.
13The term α0 can be interpreted as the expenditure required for a minimal standard of living
when prices are unity (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). Therefore, in the estimation I set it just below
the minimum value of ln(x).
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additional restrictions must hold:
homogeneity
N
∑
i=1
γi j = 0, i = 1, ...,N (7)
symmetry
γi j = γ ji. (8)
Homogeneity requires that the demand functions are homogeneous of degree
zero in prices, while symmetry requires that the cross price derivatives of the com-
pensated demand functions are identical.
Banks et al. (1997) showed that the demand system in equation (5) can be
derived from the following indirect utility
lnV =
{[
lnx− ln(a(p))
b(p)
]−1
+λ (p)
}−1
(9)
where λ (p) =
N
∑
i=1
λiln(pi). As I will discuss in Section 5, equation (9) is key for
the computation of the welfare effects of the PAL program.
Elasticities Given the estimated parameters of the QUAIDS, income elasticities
are computed from the following equations:
ηi =
μi
wi
+1 =
1
wi
(
βi+
2λi
b(p)
log
(
x
a(p)
))
+1, (10)
where μi = ∂wi∂x . Uncompensated price elasticities are given by
ηui j =
1
wi
(
γi j −μi
(
α j +∑
k
γ jklogpk
)
− λiβ j
b(p)
(
log
(
x
a(p)
))2)
−δi j (11)
where δi j is the Kronecker delta. Compensated price elasticities are given by
ηci j = η
u
i j +ηiw j. (12)
Moreover, in order to be consistent with utility maximization, the following
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4.2 Methodological issues
4.2.1 Separability between food and non food
In modeling household demand, I assume that household preferences are weakly
separable between food and non-food consumption. Under separability, the demand
of different food commodities depends only on the relative prices of food and on
total food expenditure (instead of depending on total expenditure and on both food
and other commodity prices).
This assumption is introduced for two main reasons. First, as noted in Section
3.2, food represents almost 70 percent of total household expenditure. Estimation
of the welfare effects on the demand for food is therefore an economically mean-
ingful exercise. Moreover, with food being such a large fraction of the household
budget, although some substitutability between food and non-food might exist, it
is likely to be relatively small. The second reason has to do with the lack of price
measures for non-food commodities. The store surveys contains information about
the prices of many food commodities, but not about the prices of other goods. The
household survey collected information about non-food expenditure, but not about
the quantities purchased. As a result, it is not possible to construct unit values (that
is, the ratio between the expenditure and the quantity purchased) for non-food com-
modities. As information on prices is key in the estimation of a demand system, I
impose separability and model the demand of food only. 14
4.2.2 Variables construction: food groups, budget shares and prices
To model the demand for food I use information on self-reported consumption and
expenditure for 57 food commodities, of which ten are provided in-kind by the
PAL program (see Table 1). 15 Separately modeling the demand for all these goods
14Separability has been tested in different contexts and there is mixed evidence in the literature
about its validity. Regarding separability between food and non-food, Moschini et al. (1994) find
evidence in support of separability in the US, with results that are robust to several specifications for
the demand system.
15I have excluded four goods (soy, goat/lamb meat, wheat tortilla, tomato paste) for which con-
sumption is observed for less than 2% of households at baseline and one good (chocolate drink)
because consumption data were collected only at follow-up but not at baseline.
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would be practically and computationally unfeasible, especially for those goods
that are consumed infrequently. For this reason, I aggregate food commodities into
nine groups, four for PAL goods (PAL grains, PAL pulses, PAL vegetable oil, PAL
meat and dairy) and five for other goods (fruit and vegetables, corn, wheat, meat
and dairy, other foods).16
The chosen grouping is particularly detailed for grains. The motivation for this
stems from two observations. First, a large fraction of the household budget is spent
on grains (approximately 34 percent of total food expenditure). However, while
some grains (e.g., corn, beans and rice) are basic staples in the Mexican diet, other
types of grains (e.g., wheat) are typically luxury goods (Attanasio et al., 2013).
Second, the large majority of goods subsidized in-kind by the PAL program is rep-
resented by grains. Since both cash and in-kind transfers might induce households
to move from low to high quality grains by increasing household income (and, for
an extra-marginal in-kind transfer, by implicitly changing the relative prices), it is
important to model the substitutability between different types of grains in order to
estimate household demand and welfare accurately.
For each food commodity included in the survey, households had to report the
quantity consumed, the quantity purchased, the corresponding expenditure and, if
applicable, the quantity consumed of home-produced goods in the last seven days.17
Weekly quantities and expenditure are converted into monthly quantities and expen-
diture for consistency with the monthly delivery of PAL in-kind transfers.
The budget share of each food group is constructed by taking the ratio between
the sum of the expenditures of the individual items in that food group and the to-
tal food expenditure. Expenditure includes an estimation of the value of home-
produced goods, which is given as the product between the home-produced quan-
tity and the median price of the good (constructed as reported below) within the
village. Households mainly self-produce some varieties of vegetables and fruit and
corn grains, while self-production of animal products is far less frequent (the only
16Table B1 in the Appendix reports the commodities included in each food group.
17Quantities are usually reported in kilos or liters. When other units of measurements have been
reported (e.g. piece or packet), I have converted quantities in kilos or liters using conversion factors
from the National Institute of Health (INSP). I thank Vincenzo Di Maro for providing me with INSP
conversion factors.
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notable exception being eggs). With respect to PAL goods, the basket is mainly
represented by packaged commodities produced outside the villages. While less
than 1 percent of the households in the sample self-produced rice and lentils, beans
represent the only case for which self-production is relatively important, accounting
for approximately 11 percent of the total expenditure in beans.
Table 3 reports the average budget shares of the different commodity groups,
separately for each treatment arm.18 Households spend approximately 20 percent
of their budget on PAL goods, with the highest shares being the one for grains and
pulses (approximately 14 percent of total food expenditure). Cereals (both PAL
and non-PAL) and animal products together represent around half of total food
expenditure, while fruit and vegetable constitute about 18 percent of the total food
expenditure. Table 4 also shows that budget shares are overall balanced across
households in the different treatment groups.
There are two price measures in the PAL data: unit values from the household
survey (i.e., the ratio between the expenditure and the quantity purchased of a given
good); and posted prices from a survey of local shops. While in general the use of
store prices might mitigate potential measurement error and “quality effects” from
using unit values (Deaton, 1988; Crawford et al., 2003; McKelvey, 2011), there
are important differences in the quality of the baseline and endline store price data
that should be taken into account.19 First, prices were not collected in 12 percent
of baseline villages. Second, in the baseline survey price data are available for a
subset of 34 food commodities (out of the 57 included in the analysis). Third, even
within villages where local shops were surveyed, the number of surveyed shops was
higher in follow-up villages than in baseline villages.20
For these reasons, prices are constructed combining both data sources. Given
the lower quality of the baseline price survey, pre-program prices are constructed
as the median unit values within a village. If less than 10 percent of households
18AppendixC shows the average expenditure share of all the individual goods used in the analysis.
19Quality effects might arise if consumers react to variation in prices by adjusting both quantities
and quality, in which case the observed variation in unit values would be lower than the actual
variation in prices. This can lead to spurious correlation between the budget share and the unit
value, resulting in exaggerated estimates of own-price elasticities.
20In the baseline, an average of 1.4 stores per village was surveyed, against an average of 1.9
stores per village at follow-up. More details about store price data are presented in Appendix B2.
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Table 3: Baseline budget shares by treatment group
Control In-Kind Cash (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (2)-(3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PAL grains 6.20 6.42 6.16 0.22 -0.04 0.26
(6.08) (6.16) (5.52) (0.48) (0.49) (0.41)
PAL pulses 7.24 8.08 7.82 0.84 0.58 0.26
(7.24) (8.11) (7.67) (0.64) (0.70) (0.75)
PAL vegetable oil 4.52 4.84 5.09 0.32 0.57* -0.25
(3.73) (3.72) (4.08) (0.27) (0.31) (0.25)
PAL meat and dairy 0.98 1.07 1.27 0.09 0.29 -0.20
(2.68) (3.06) (4.25) (0.14) (0.23) (0.22)
Fruit and vegetables 18.41 17.98 18.65 -0.43 0.24 -0.67
(9.95) (10.40) (11.10) (0.63) (0.82) (0.75)
Corn 16.83 16.52 16.93 -0.31 0.10 -0.41
(12.84) (13.69) (13.42) (1.16) (1.26) (1.17)
Wheat 3.66 3.33 3.26 -0.34 -0.41 0.07
(4.80) (4.86) (4.23) (0.32) (0.36) (0.28)
Meat and dairy 25.75 25.93 25.25 0.18 -0.50 0.68
(14.79) (15.22) (15.30) (1.31) (1.45) (1.29)
Other foods 16.40 15.82 15.58 -0.58 -0.82 0.24
(10.45) (9.48) (9.86) (0.57) (0.60) (0.48)
N 1268 2679 1386
Notes: Budget shares are multiplied by 100. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors, clustered
at the village level, for the differences in columns (4) to (6) and standard deviations elsewhere. *,
**, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level, respectively.
in a village purchased a given good, I have taken the median unit value in the
municipality (or, if less than 10 percent of households in the municipality purchased
the good, the median unit value within the state). On the contrary, given the better
quality of the follow-up price data, I have computed post-program prices as the
median store prices in the village. Again, if village-level prices are missing for
some good, I have taken the median prices within the municipality or state.21
The price index for a food group is constructed as the geometric mean of the
commodity prices in that food group.22The first three columns of Table 4 report
21The details of the imputation process are presented in Appendix B3, which also discusses in
more detail the construction of the variables used in the estimation.
22The weight for a commodity within a food group is given by the ratio between the state-level
expenditure for that commodity and the state-level expenditure for the food group. I use state-
level weights instead of village or municipality weights since weights would be zero or unit for a
substantial fraction of villages and commodities. See Appendix B3 for further details.
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the mean and standard deviation of the baseline price indices, separately for each
treatment arm.23 As one can see, there is considerable variation in the price indices,
which reflects variation in local prices across localities. The last three columns of
the table show that none of the price differences between one treatment group and
another is statistically significant.
Table 4: Baseline food price indices by treatment group
Control In-Kind Cash (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (2)-(3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PAL grains 2.33 2.33 2.33 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.12) (0.11) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
PAL pulses 2.36 2.32 2.32 -0.03 -0.04 0.01
(0.15) (0.20) (0.18) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
PAL vegetable oil 2.35 2.35 2.33 -0.00 -0.02 0.01
(0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
PAL meat and dairy 3.39 3.38 3.40 -0.01 0.01 -0.02
(0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Fruit and vegetables 2.05 2.05 2.04 -0.00 -0.01 0.00
(0.13) (0.11) (0.10) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Corn 1.41 1.41 1.38 0.00 -0.03 0.03
(0.20) (0.20) (0.17) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Wheat 2.66 2.62 2.61 -0.04 -0.05 0.01
(0.25) (0.21) (0.27) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Meat and dairy 3.29 3.29 3.29 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.13) (0.12) (0.10) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Other foods 2.92 2.95 2.95 0.03 0.03 0.00
(0.23) (0.22) (0.18) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
N 1268 2679 1386
Notes: Prices are reported in natural logarithms. The price of a food group is the geometric mean of
the prices of the individual commodities within the food group. Weights are given by the state-level
budget share of the commodity within the food group. Prices of the individual commodities are
median unit values within a village. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors, clustered at the
village level, for the differences in columns (4) to (6) and standard deviations elsewhere. *, **, ***
denote significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level, respectively.
23Appendix C shows the unit values for each commodity used in the analysis.
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4.3 Estimation
The parameters of the demand system are estimated using the iterated linear least
square estimator proposed by Blundell and Robin (1999) which relies on the obser-
vation that, conditional on the price indices a(p) and b(p), the budget shares are
linear in explanatory variables and parameters. Therefore, starting from an initial
guess for the price indices, estimates of the parameters can be used to update the
price indices and reestimate the model until convergence is achieved.
Another attractive characteristics of this estimator is that it allows to correct
for endogeneity by employing a control function approach. This relies on the as-
sumption that the error terms in the budget share equations have an orthogonal
decomposition (i.e., ui = ρ
′
i vi + εi) and on the existence of an instrument which is
uncorrelated with εi. The correction for endogeneity is then implemented in two
stages. In the first stage, the endogenous variables are regressed on exogenous
variables and on the set of available instruments. In the second stage, the demand
system, augmented with the residuals vˆi from the first stage, is estimated using the
iterative procedure described above.
Correcting for endogeneity is potentially important, since a number of studies
show that total expenditure is often endogenous in the estimation of demand sys-
tems (Banks et al., 1997; Blundell and Robin, 1999). However, this relies on the
existence of an instrument which is correlated with total expenditure but that can be
excluded from the budget share equations. Standard instruments used in the liter-
ature are household income or wages, which are unfortunately not available in the
PAL data. To overcome this issue, I use a wealth index constructed as the sum of
11 indicators of durable ownership (e.g., television, radio, refrigerator).
In the Appendix, I show that this instrument is strongly correlated with house-
hold’s food expenditure. It is harder to prove that it should be excluded from the
budget share equations, though. The motivation for this is in the same spirit of
the two-stage budgeting hypothesis. Assuming that a household would first choose
how much of his income is allocated to buy durable goods and then how much of his
non-durables income is devoted to food consumption, under separability between
durables and non-durables the wealth index should not impact food budget shares
but through total expenditure.
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Budget shares are allowed to depend on household demographic characteristics
by including the following variables within the intercept of the demand system: the
number of household members; the number of 0−5 years old children; the age of
the household head; the education of the household head; an indicator for the house-
hold being indigenous; an indicator for the head of the household being female; the
total population in the village; and state and month of the survey indicators.
I have estimated the demand system on the full sample of baseline households
imposing all restrictions from the theory. Standard errors are computed using a
cluster-robust bootstrap estimator, which takes into account the correlation in the
error terms at the village level. Data on follow-up households are not used in the
estimation for two main reasons. First, the main objective of the paper is to show
how a demand system can be used to conduct an ex-ante estimation of welfare
effects from in-kind and cash transfers using only pre-program data. Second, using
the endline data for the in-kind recipients in the estimation could result in estimation
bias if the in-kind transfer is extra-marginal since the estimated parameters of the
demand system would reflect the change in the consumption patterns induced by
the transfer rather than genuine response of household demand to relative prices
and expenditure. As I will discuss, the sample of follow-up households is instead
used to test the validity of the model and to conduct the welfare analysis.
5 Estimating welfare effects
Given its consistency with consumer theory, the QUAIDS has been widely used
to study the welfare implications of different policies affecting either income or
prices.24 This section shows how demand systems could also be used to quantify
the welfare effects of policies providing subsidies in-kind.
This is a more complex task in that, instead of exogenously changing the price
of a good or the income of a consumer, an in-kind transfer rather subsidizes a fixed
bundle of goods. However, intuitively a transfer in-kind can be seen as implicitly
24Banks et al. (1997) study the welfare loss of introducing a tax reform increasing sales tax on
clothing in the UK; Attanasio et al. (2013) used the QUAIDS to estimate the welfare loss of food
price increases in Mexico.
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changing both income and relative prices: the transfer increases the recipient bud-
get but, if it is extra-marginal, it also makes the subsidized goods relatively more
convenient. Therefore, as discussed in Section 2, a solution to this problem is to
compute the virtual prices (and the virtual income) at which a consumer would be
as well off as with the transfer in-kind.
In order to describe the procedure, it is useful to proceed by steps and to intro-
duce some notation. Let J be the set of subsidized goods, and, for j ∈ J, let p j , p∗j
and q¯ j be respectively the market price, the virtual price and the subsidized quantity
of good j. Moreover, let
(
aˆ, βˆ , γˆ, λˆ , ρˆ
)
be the set of estimated parameters of the
QUAIDS in equation (5).
1. From the estimated parameters of the demand system, compute the coun-
terfactual demand of a consumer upon receiving a cash-equivalent transfer
x¯ = ∑
j∈J
q¯ j p j. This is simply done using equation (5) to compute the budget
shares of all goods in the demand system, wˆi, for an income level equal to
x+ x¯, and then converting shares into quantities, i.e. qˆi =
wˆi·(x+x¯)
pi
.
2. For each subsidized good j ∈ J, compare the predicted quantities qˆ j with the
subsidize quantities q¯ j. The transfer is infra-marginal if qˆ j ≥ q¯ j for all j ∈ J,
and extra-marginal if qˆ j < q¯ j for at least one j ∈ J. Let K ⊆ J be the subset
of extra-marginal goods.
3. For infra-marginal goods, the virtual price is trivially equal to the market
price. For all extra-marginal goods k ∈ K, virtual prices are computed from
the system of equations in (5) by fixing the quantity of the goods to the sub-
sidy level
some of the prices within the indices are virtual prices rather than market prices.
where x∗ = x+ ∑
j∈J
p∗j q¯ j is the sum of the pre-transfer income and of the “vir-
tual value” of the in-kind subsidy.25
25 Note that the price indices have been denoted with a(p∗) and b(p∗) to highlight the fact that
wk =
p∗kq¯k
x∗
= αˆk+∑
i/∈K
γˆkilog(pi)+∑
l∈K
γˆkl log(p∗l )+ βˆklog
(
x∗
a(p∗)
)
+
λˆk
b(p∗)
(
log
(
x∗
a(p∗)
))2
+ ρˆkv̂
(13)
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4. After finding the virtual prices, recompute the quantities consumed of all
goods in the demand system using the virtual prices instead of the market
prices and check that qˆ j ≥ q¯ j for all j ∈ J. This step is important because,
even though a given subsidized good might not be extra-marginal under the
cash-equivalent transfer in step 1, it might be extra-marginal under the new
set of (virtual) prices. By construction, virtual prices are lower than market
prices. Therefore, if the cross-price elasticity of the infra-marginal good with
other extra-marginal goods is sufficiently large, the virtual reduction in prices
might cause the demand of the (previously) infra-marginal good to fall below
the subsidized quantity. When this occurs, repeat step 3 by simultaneously
solving equation (13) for all the extra-marginal goods, and repeat the proce-
dure until qˆ j ≥ q¯ j for all j ∈ J.
5. Steps 1 to 4 provide a solution for the virtual prices and for the post-transfer
expenditure x∗. Using equation (9) the utility for an infra-marginal transfer is
given by
lnVk =
{[
ln(x+ x¯)− ln(a(p))
b(p)
]−1
+λ (p)
}−1
(14)
while the utility for an extra-marginal transfer is
lnVk =
{[
ln(x∗)− ln(a(p∗))
b(p∗)
]−1
+λ (p∗)
}−1
. (15)
6. To find a money metric measure of utility, compute the income for which
the household should be compensated in order to be as well off as with the
in-kind transfer, given the vector of market prices p. In other words, find xk
such that [(
log(xk)− log(a(p))
b(p)
)−1
+λ (p)
]−1
= lnVk, (16)
where lnVk is given by (14) for an infra-marginal transfer and by (15) for an
extra-marginal transfer.
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In the PAL program application, I measure welfare by computing the equivalent
variation, which is given by EV = xk − x. This is a natural choice since the equiv-
alent variation can be interpreted as measuring the recipient’s willingness to pay
for the in-kind transfer. Note that one nice feature of the above procedure is that,
given variation in market prices, expenditure and demographic characteristics, vir-
tual prices can be computed at the individual level. This allows to construct a dis-
tribution of the welfare effects among recipients and, therefore, to study how the
willingness to pay varies with household characteristics.
It is important to emphasize that the analysis above assumes that goods trans-
ferred in-kind can not be sold. This is apparent when looking at equation (13) since
the computation of the virtual price requires that the recipient consumes exactly as
much of the subsidized goods as it is transferred in-kind. In the context of PAL,
reselling was not officially prohibited but there is no clear evidence on whether it
occurred or not. However, two observations are in order. First, since PAL villages
are generally isolated, reselling goods outside the village might be quite costly. Sec-
ond, the high take-up of the program suggests that most households within a village
received the same food basket. If preferences for the subsidized goods are not
too heterogenous, the extent of within-village reselling might be relatively limited.
Despite these observations, if the no reselling assumption is violated, the welfare
effects computed in steps 1-6 would represent lower bounds to the “true” welfare
effects (see Figure 1a).
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6 Results
6.1 Model parameters and specification
In this section, I report a selection of the estimated parameters, which I use to
discuss two specific features of the chosen specification for the demand system:
the endogeneity of food expenditure and the nonlinearity of the budget shares with
respect to household expenditure. Appendix C3 shows the full set of estimated
parameters.
In the first stage, ln(x) and [ln(x)]2 are regressed on the wealth index and on
its square. The results are reported in Appendix C2. The F statistics for the null
hypothesis that the coefficients of the instruments are jointly zero is above 140 in
each equation, suggesting that the instruments are indeed strongly correlated with
the logarithms of total food expenditure and its square. Following the control func-
tion approach, the demand system is augmented with the residuals from the first
stage regressions. The coefficients associated with the first-stage residuals for ln(x)
and [ln(x)]2 are denoted respectively with pˆi1 and pˆi2 (i = 1, ...,N being an index
for the i-th equation of the demand system), and are reported in the second and
third columns of Table 5. A t-test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients in each
equation is zero can be interpreted as a test of exogeneity of food expenditure. As
one can see, the coefficients are significantly different from zero in several equa-
tions. Moreover, joint tests of exogeneity of total food expenditure, performed by
separately testing the null hypotheses that pˆi1 = 0 for all i and pˆi2 = 0 for all i,
are strongly rejected (see last row of Table 5). Taken together, these results imply
that it is important to take into account the endogeneity of food expenditure and,
therefore, all the results reported correct for it.
Table 5 also reports the estimated coefficients on the square of food expendi-
ture, λˆi . For three out of nine food groups, the coefficient is statistically different
from zero, suggesting the existence of nonlinearities. This becomes even more ap-
parent if we look at Figure 2, which shows the Engel curves for each food group
with prices and household demographic characteristics fixed to their sample means.
Consistently with the results of Table 5, PAL grains, PAL meat and dairy, fruit and
vegetables and corn exhibit a strong nonlinear response. For the remaining food
groups (PAL pulses, PAL vegetable oil, wheat, meat and dairy and other foods), the
relationship with total food expenditure is very close to linear.
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Table 5: Estimated parameters of the QUAIDS
λˆi pˆi1 pˆi2
PAL grains 0.009** 0.151*** -0.010***
(0.004) (0.051) (0.004)
PAL pulses -0.011 -0.018 0.005
(0.008) (0.112) (0.008)
PAL vegetable oil 0.007 0.057 -0.004
(0.004) (0.057) (0.004)
PAL meat and dairy 0.003 0.037 -0.003*
(0.002) (0.023) (0.002)
Fruit and vegetables 0.023*** 0.323*** -0.027***
(0.008) (0.100) (0.007)
Corn -0.035*** -0.298 0.025*
(0.012) (0.197) (0.014)
Wheat -0.001 -0.051 0.003
(0.006) (0.044) (0.003)
Meat and dairy 0.013 0.100 -0.014
(0.009) (0.140) (0.010)
Other foods -0.007 -0.300* 0.025**
(0.011) (0.171) (0.013)
Joint exogeneity test: χ2 34.5 41.9
Notes: Estimation of the system of equation (5). Standard errors are reported in parentheses and
are computed using a bootstrap estimator accounting for clustering at the village level. 500 replica-
tions of the bootstrap have been used. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level,
respectively.
6.2 Elasticities
Table 6 reports income and own-price elasticities, which are computed from the
estimated parameters of the demand system as described by equations (10)-(12).
Prices, expenditure and other demographic characteristics are set at the sample
mean. As can be seen in the first column, with the exception of PAL meat and
dairy, the commodities transferred by the PAL program are necessities. As one
would expect, fruit and vegetables and animal products are luxuries. Consistently
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Figure 2: Engel curves
with what is found in other studies in Mexico (Attanasio et al., 2013), wheat cereals
are luxuries, while corn cereals are strong necessities. Indeed, while corn cere-
als represent more than 40 percent of the average caloric intake among the poor in
Mexico, wheat-based products constitute only 3 percent of it (Skoufias et al., 2009).
Note that all the results obtained for the income elasticities of demand are consis-
tent with the Engel curves plotted in Figure 2, where the budget shares of luxury
(necessity) goods are increasing (decreasing) in household expenditure.
Turning to the analysis of the price elasticities, all compensated and uncompen-
sated own-price elasticities have the expected sign. Meat and dairy, PAL pulses and
PAL meat and dairy are the most price-elastic goods, while corn cereals and other
foods are the least elastic. The full set of compensated and uncompensated cross-
price elasticities is reported in Appendix C3. As expected, different types of cereals
(i.e., PAL grains, corn and wheat) present some degree of substitutability between
each others, even though the cross-price elasticities are often not statistically differ-
ent from zero.
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Table 6: Income and own-price elasticities
Income
elasticities
Uncompensated
Own-price
Elasticities
Compensated
Own-price
Elasticities
PAL grains 0.688*** -0.881** -0.839**
(0.104) (0.300) (0.299)
PAL pulses -0.031 -1.300*** -1.303***
(0.133) (0.276) (0.277)
PAL vegetable oil 0.503*** -0.924*** -0.901***
(0.093) (0.252) (0.252)
PAL meat and dairy 1.652*** -1.163** -1.147**
(0.329) (0.463) (0.463)
Fruit and vegetables 1.331*** -0.916*** -0.684***
(0.073) (0.161) (0.163)
Corn 0.450*** -0.339* -0.258
(0.117) (0.204) (0.195)
Wheat 1.484*** -0.903*** -0.852***
(0.185) (0.159) (0.160)
Meat and dairy 1.747*** -1.272*** -0.834***
(0.078) (0.149) (0.149)
Other foods 0.744*** -0.724*** -0.604***
(0.080) (0.103) (0.101)
Notes: Elasticites are computed from equations (10)-(12), with prices expenditure and household
demographic characteristics fixed at their sample mean. Standard errors are computed using the
delta method. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level, respectively.
6.3 Model fit
In order to understand if the model is capable of reproducing the consumption pat-
terns observed in the data, in this section I perform in-sample and out-of-sample
tests of the model’s validity. The QUAIDS is estimated on the sample of baseline
households. As a first test, I first split the estimation sample into quintiles along
the food expenditure distribution; then, for each quintile, I compare the average ac-
tual budget shares against the average predicted budget shares of each food group.
Given estimates of the model’s parameters, predicted budget shares are computed
from equation (5). The standard errors for the difference between the actual and
the predicted budget shares have been computed using a bootstrap clustered at the
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 39 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1850
village level. Table 7 shows that the model is able to replicate extremely well the
evolution of the household budget composition across the expenditure distribution.
The differences between the observed and the predicted budget shares are small and
almost never statistically significant.
It is also interesting to see how the composition of food expenditure changes
with household income. While households in the first quintile spend about 40 per-
cent of their budget in various types of cereals and grains (PAL grains, PAL pulses,
corn and wheat), this is only equal to 28 percent of the budget for households in the
top quintile. The budget share of PAL pulses in the top quintile is about half of the
budget share for the bottom quintile, which is consistent with the fact that pulses
are overall strong necessities and might even be inferior goods towards the top of
the income distribution (see Table 6). Similarly, the budget share of meat almost
doubles when moving from the lowest to the highest quintile. The budget share
of fruit and vegetables is instead relatively flat, partly due to the fact that the very
poor might be able to compensate the expenditure differential by increasing their
consumption of home-produced goods.
The validity of the model is further tested within the following out-of-sample
exercise, which exploits the experimental design of the PAL program. I first com-
pute the experimental impact of the PAL cash transfer on the household budget
structure, which is done in two ways: (i) as the average difference between the
budget share of households in the cash treatment arm and the budget share of
households in the control group, using only the endline sample (cross-sectional
difference); and (ii) by subtracting from the cross-sectional difference the aver-
age pre-program difference between the budget shares of the cash and the budget
shares of the control treatment groups (difference-in-difference). The experimental
impacts, labelled respectively with “CSD” (cross-sectional difference) and “DID”
(difference-in-difference), are reported in the second and third columns of Table 8.
The next step is to use the estimated model to simulate the provision of a 150 pesos
cash transfer and to compute the predicted impacts of this subsidy on the house-
hold budget composition. This is done on the control group endline sample, thus
making the test completely out-of-sample. The predicted impacts, reported in the
first column of Table 8, are computed as the average difference between the simu-
lated budget share under the cash transfer and the actual budget share for the control
group.
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Table 7: Actual and predicted budget shares by food expenditure quintiles
1st quintile 2nd quintile 3rd quintile 4th quintile 5th quintile
(1) (2) (1)-(2) (1) (2) (1)-(2) (1) (2) (1)-(2) (1) (2) (1)-(2) (1) (2) (1)-(2)
Pred. Actual Pred. Actual Pred. Actual Pred. Actual Pred. Actual
PAL grains 7.27 7.47 -0.20 6.80 6.58 0.22 6.43 6.18 0.26 5.97 5.86 0.10 5.24 5.40 -0.16
(0.38) (0.34) (0.20) (0.26) (0.25) (0.20) (0.24) (0.21) (0.20) (0.23) (0.23) (0.19) (0.25) (0.21) (0.19)
PAL pulses 10.92 11.61 -0.69** 8.92 8.63 0.30 7.86 7.40 0.46 6.69 6.38 0.31 4.91 5.05 -0.14
(0.64) (0.62) (0.35) (0.53) (0.41) (0.40) (0.51) (0.34) (0.43) (0.49) (0.23) (0.43) (0.54) (0.23) (0.47)
PAL
vegetable oil
6.97 7.36 -0.39** 5.48 5.13 0.34** 4.76 4.58 0.18 4.11 3.93 0.18 3.02 3.14 -0.12
(0.32) (0.29) (0.19) (0.19) (0.14) (0.17) (0.18) (0.12) (0.18) (0.18) (0.10) (0.18) (0.20) (0.11) (0.18)
PAL meat and
dairy
0.89 0.84 0.05 1.10 1.14 -0.04 1.15 1.14 0.00 1.19 1.14 0.05 1.24 1.24 0.00
(0.10) (0.11) (0.07) (0.09) (0.15) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) (0.08)
Fruit and
vegetables
17.39 17.18 0.21 18.34 18.29 0.04 18.44 18.29 0.15 18.64 19.03 -0.38 18.57 18.52 0.05
(0.56) (0.54) (0.27) (0.38) (0.40) (0.33) (0.40) (0.43) (0.39) (0.41) (0.39) (0.37) (0.52) (0.47) (0.45)
Corn 20.32 20.63 -0.32 17.84 17.47 0.36 16.69 17.42 -0.73 15.31 14.88 0.43 13.20 13.10 0.10
(1.07) (1.24) (0.42) (0.63) (0.63) (0.52) (0.62) (0.66) (0.55) (0.63) (0.49) (0.61) (0.78) (0.49) (0.68)
Wheat 2.36 2.07 0.29 2.92 2.91 0.01 3.32 3.53 -0.21 3.80 3.96 -0.15 4.45 4.49 -0.03
(0.36) (0.23) (0.22) (0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.25) (0.20) (0.19)
Meat and
dairy
17.13 16.13 0.99 23.23 23.87 -0.63 26.09 26.10 -0.01 28.88 29.89 -1.01 32.67 32.59 0.08
(0.92) (0.95) (0.80) (0.95) (0.66) (0.85) (1.05) (0.73) (0.89) (1.07) (0.56) (0.96) (1.28) (0.68) (0.99)
Other foods 16.75 16.71 0.04 15.38 15.98 -0.60** 15.26 15.37 -0.11 15.41 14.94 0.47 16.70 16.47 0.23
(0.48) (0.44) (0.28) (0.35) (0.32) (0.29) (0.35) (0.36) (0.35) (0.34) (0.29) (0.31) (0.56) (0.43) (0.37)
Notes: Predicted budget shares are computed from equation (5). Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are computed using a bootstrap
clustered at the village level. 500 replications of the bootstrap have been used. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level,
respectively.
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Table 8: Predicted and experimental impacts of the PAL cash transfer on the house-
hold budget
Experimental impacts Differences
Predicted
impact
CSD DID (2)-(1) (3)-(1)
(1) (2) (3)
PAL grains 0.05 -0.15 -0.03 -0.20 -0.08
(0.68) (0.56) (0.37) (0.57) (0.69)
PAL pulses -1.07 -0.64 -1.24 0.43 -0.17
(1.01) (0.66) (0.53) (0.66) (1.08)
PAL vegetable oil -0.54 -0.30 -0.93 0.23 -0.39
(0.42) (0.27) (0.32) (0.27) (0.48)
PAL meat and dairy 0.50 0.50 0.16 -0.00 -0.35
(0.32) (0.20) (0.22) (0.20) (0.38)
Fruit and vegetables 1.53 1.69 1.27 0.16 -0.26
(1.19) (1.06) (0.92) (1.05) (1.14)
Corn -0.50 -0.88 -0.81 -0.38 -0.31
(1.27) (1.22) (1.02) (1.22) (1.35)
Wheat 0.32 0.21 0.67 -0.11 0.35
(0.40) (0.41) (0.28) (0.42) (0.44)
Meat and dairy 1.01 1.68 2.11 0.67 1.10
(1.48) (1.60) (1.27) (1.58) (1.73)
Other foods -1.31 -2.12 -1.20 -0.81 0.11
(1.09) (0.67) (0.67) (0.66) (1.05)
Notes: Predicted impacts are computed from model (5). CSD=cross-sectional difference;
DID=difference-in-difference. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are computed us-
ing a bootstrap clustered at the village level. 500 replications of the bootstrap have been used. *, **,
*** denote significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level, respectively.
The experimental impacts suggest that the cash transfer had a limited effect
on the household budget structure. As compared to the control group, households
in the cash treatment arm have on average larger budget shares for luxuries (PAL
meat, meat and dairy, fruit and vegetables, wheat) although the magnitude of such
differences is small. Overall, both the direction and the size of the predicted impacts
are very similar to those of the actual impacts. The fourth and fifth columns of
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Table 8 show the differences between the actual and the predicted impacts, with
standard errors computed using a bootstrap clustered at the village level. None of
the differences is statistically significant, although the precision of the estimates of
the experimental and of the actual impacts is rather low.
7 Welfare analysis
In this section, I compute the welfare effect of the PAL program following the
procedure described in Section 5. The simulation exercise is performed on the
sample of households in the control group in the post-intervention period. I contrast
two simulation scenarios. In the first scenario, I assume that local prices are not
affected by the provision of the in-kind transfer. As a result, recipient’s willingness
to pay reflects exclusively the value that a recipient attaches to the food basket. In
the second scenario, I incorporate in the welfare analysis the effect that the PAL
program had on local prices, as estimated by Cunha et al. (2018).
7.1 Welfare effects under constant prices
The first step of the welfare analysis requires estimating household demand under
a cash-equivalent transfer which, given variation across villages in the prices of
the subsidized goods, varies at the locality level. Comparing the predicted and
the subsidized quantities for each subsidized good reveals that the transfer in-kind
is extra-marginal for almost every recipient. Therefore, in order to quantify the
welfare effects of the in-kind transfer, it is necessary to compute the virtual prices
of the extra-marginal goods by solving the system of equations (13).26
Figure 3 plots the distribution of the equivalent variation, EV , reported in pesos.
The dashed line represents the median, while the solid line indicates the mean. In
order to contrast the welfare of households receiving the in-kind subsidy with that
of households receiving the cash transfer, I have indicated with the dash-dotted line
the value of the cash transfer, which was fixed for each household and equal to 150
26For some values of the estimated parameters and of the data, a solution to this system might not
exist. However, in this context, virtual prices can be obtained for 96 percent of the sample.
pesos. Clearly, the equivalent variation of a 150 pesos cash transfer is trivially equal
to 150 pesos.
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Figure 3: Distribution of the willingness to pay for the in-kind transfer
Both the mean and median willingness to pay are approximately equal to 168
pesos. This implies that, on average, households valued more the in-kind transfer
than a 150 pesos cash transfer. For approximately 25 percent of the households, the
equivalent variation is lower than 150 pesos and, therefore, these households would
be better off receiving the in-kind transfer instead of the cash transfer. However, it
should be noted that the welfare loss of the in-kind subsidy is not negligible. The
market value of the PAL food basket, computed using follow-up store prices, was
approximately 210 pesos. This implies that about 42 pesos of the total value of the
transfer are extra-marginal. In other words, recipients valued the in-kind transfer at
approximately 80 percent of its face value. Therefore, a significant fraction of the
efficiency gains that could have been achieved with the in-kind transfer are lost as a
result of the choice of transferring commodities which are extra-marginal for most
recipients.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 44 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1850
7.2 Welfare effects under PAL price changes
In a recent paper, Cunha et al. (2018) studied the effect of PAL on local prices
by exploiting the experimental design of the program. They find that in villages
receiving the in-kind transfer subsidized commodity prices were on average 3.7
percent lower than in villages in the control group, a result which is consistent with
the increased supply of these goods. On the other hand, the injection of money in
villages in the cash treatment arm was not large enough to determine a significant
increase in food prices. In order to account for the “price effect” of the program,
in this section I use the estimated model of the demand to simulate a 3.7 percent
reduction in the prices of PAL goods and study how recipient welfare changes in this
scenario. It is worth noting that the prices of other foodstuffs which are substitutes
or complements with the subsidized goods could also change as a result of changes
in the demand of these goods. Because Cunha et al. (2018) do not find any change
in non-PAL prices, I assume that these are constant in the simulation.
In principle, a reduction in the prices has two opposite effects on household wel-
fare as compared to the scenario with constant prices. On one hand, lower prices
of the subsidized goods would mechanically decrease the face value of the food
basket. On the other hand, recipients pay lower prices for out-of-pocket purchases
of the subsidized good. The results in Figure 4 suggest that the latter effect is pre-
dominant. The median willingness to pay for the in-kind subsidy is approximately
187 pesos, while the mean is 189 pesos. This represents a 12 percent increase in
household welfare with respect to the scenario with constant prices.
It should be noted that the change in the prices of PAL goods might imply very
different welfare effects for producers and consumers of PAL goods. While the re-
duction in prices translates into additional welfare gains for consumers, producers
might incur in a welfare loss as a result of lower profits. Studying the effect of
the PAL program on the supply side of the market would require information on
food production, as the negative effects of the reduction in prices would be borne
by producers of the PAL goods (or of close substitutes of PAL goods). As this
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per. 27However, two observations are in order. First, most of the goods transferred
in-kind are packaged commodities produced outside the villages. Second, while
food production is not observed, the household survey reveals some information
about consumption from self-production. For the three commodities that might be
produced locally (i.e., rice, beans, lentils), the only one for which self-production
is meaningful is represented by beans: while 10 percent of baseline households
consumed beans from self-production, less than 1 percent of households consumed
self-produced rice or lentils. These two observations suggest that PAL recipients
might be, on average, net consumers of the transferred goods and therefore the
welfare losses among recipients might be relatively small.
27Cunha et al. (2014) present some evidence about the effect of the program on total profits from
agricultural production but, as the authors admit, “the quality of the data on agricultural production
is not ideal”. While there seems to be a larger increase in producer’s profits under a cash transfer,
the difference with respect to in-kind transfers is not statistically significant.
information is not available in the data, I do not address this issue in the present pa-
Figure 4: Distribution of the willingness to pay for the in-kind transfer under a
change in PAL prices
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7.3 Heterogeneity
The welfare effects in Figures 3 and 4 exhibit substantial variation. Hence, it is
interesting to study which households received the largest benefits from the in-kind
transfer. The main objective of this section is to study how the welfare effects vary
across the income distribution. To do so, I run local polynomial regressions of
the willingness to pay against household total monthly expenditure (i.e., the sum
of food and non-food expenditure), which is used as a proxy for the unobserved
household income. Results are presented in Figure 5, which shows the willingness
to pay computed from both the simulation with constant prices and the simulation
with non-constant PAL prices.
Figure 5: Willingness to pay across the total expenditure distribution
The welfare effects of the in-kind transfer are clearly increasing across the total
expenditure distribution. This suggests a regressive effect of the in-kind transfer.
The estimated income elasticities in Table 6 suggest that PAL goods are, on aver-
age, normal goods. Because for households at the top of the income distribution
the consumption levels of the subsidized goods are on average larger than those of
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households at the bottom, welfare gains are larger among relatively better-off recip-
ients. Note that, when price changes are taken into account, the regressivity of the
in-kind transfer becomes even more pronounced. This is not surprising since lower
PAL prices benefit proportionally more those recipients with higher consumption
levels for those goods.
One possible concern of this analysis is the fact that relatively richer households
are larger, or they live in villages where prices for the subsidized goods are higher.
In order to shed more light on these results, I estimate the following regression in
which I control for other household demographic characteristics
EVhv = α0+α1ehv+α2vbasketv+θ ′zhv+ εhv. (17)
EVhv denotes the equivalent variation for household h in village v; ehv is the
total expenditure; vbasketv is the market value of the in-kind transfer in village v;
and zhv are household and village characteristics including the number of household
members, the age and education of the head, the total population in the village and
indicators for the head of the household being female and for the household being
indigenous.
The results of the regression are reported in Table 9. In the first column the
equivalent variation is computed from the simulation with constant prices, while
the second refer to the simulation accounting for the price change. As one would
expect, households living in villages in which the value of the basket is higher are
also those with a larger willingness to pay. Moreover, even when controlling for the
value of the basket and demographic characteristics, the coefficient on total expen-
diture is positive and significantly different from zero, which suggests that indeed
relatively richer households have a larger willingness to pay for the in-kind transfer.
The magnitude of the estimated coefficient is larger when accounting for the change
in the prices, which is consistent with the results in Figure 5. Not surprisingly, the
number of household members is positively correlated with the value of the in-kind
transfer, suggesting that for larger households the extra-marginality of the transfer
in-kind is lower.28
28The age of the household head seems to be negatively correlated with the value of the in-
kind transfer, which might reflect different dietary habits in older households. Inspections of the
data reveal that older households have lower budget shares for PAL grains as compared to younger
households. This descriptive evidence is consistent with the fact that these types of households have
a lower valuation of the in-kind transfer.
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Table 9: Heterogeneity of welfare effects
Constant prices Price change
Total expenditure 0.006*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.002)
Value PAL basket 0.559*** 0.585***
(0.063) (0.068)
Number household members 0.852 2.615***
(0.517) (0.635)
Age head -0.501*** -0.506***
(0.058) (0.067)
Education head -0.020 -0.201
(0.247) (0.303)
Indigenous household -4.989* -5.430*
(2.799) (3.031)
Female head 2.109 0.830
(1.728) (2.042)
Village population -0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
Constant 60.362*** 55.819***
(13.377) (14.485)
N 1028 1029
Notes: OLS estimates of equation (17). The dependent variable is the equivalent variation, computed
as described in Section 5. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. *, **, *** denote
significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level, respectively.
The regressive effect of the transfer in-kind is an important result. Policy mak-
ers are often concerned about providing well-targeted transfers. In this respect, it
is often claimed that despite potential efficiency losses as compared to cash trans-
fers, in-kind transfers might achieve self-targeting of recipients by providing goods
that are not appealing to the rich (Nichols and Zeckhauser, 1982; Blackorby and
Donaldson, 1988; Gahvari and Mattos, 2007). However, self-targeting of recipients
might not be easily achieved in small rural villages in which the income inequal-
ity is not very high and the existence of large stigma effects is unlikely, such as
those targeted by PAL. In this case, policy makers should take into account that
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 49 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1850
the efficiency loss of transferring goods in-kind are potentially larger for the most
vulnerable households.
7.4 Discussion and cost-efficiency
The results in the previous section suggest that the estimated welfare effects for in-
kind recipients were larger than for cash recipients. Although the in-kind transfer
is valued on average at 80 percent of its face value, the efficiency loss of the trans-
fer in-kind is not large enough to compensate for the wedge in the values of the
two transfer schemes. However, in order to determine which policy is more cost-
efficient, the administrative costs of the two transfer modalities must be taken into
account. Estimating such costs is often difficult since distribution, personnel, ware-
housing and other operational costs might vary not only across regions and over
time but also with the scale of the program. In this section, I provide a discussion
of such costs by referring to Ventura-Alfaro et al. (2011) which, to my knowledge,
represents the most careful study of the operational costs of PAL.
Excluding costs which are sustained only at the outset of the program and that
are common to both transfer modalities (such as the costs of design and evaluation
of the program and the costs of identification and incorporation of beneficiaries),
Ventura-Alfaro et al. (2011) estimate that in 2004 the total administrative costs of
the transfer in-kind correspond to approximately 22 percent of the purchasing cost
of the food basket (approximately 33 pesos per transfer). Instead, the administra-
tive costs of the cash transfer correspond to about 12 percent of the value of the
transfer.29
If we assume that a policy maker would like to evaluate the welfare gains gener-
ated by the two policies at a given cost, we can fix this cost to the total procurement
cost of the food basket (i.e., 183 pesos) and compare the average willingness to pay
29Calculations in Ventura-Alfaro et al. (2011) are based on consultation of the program registries
and follow the procedure of Caldes et al. (2006). The costs of worker salaries by program activ-
ity were imputed from the self-reported time that a worker devoted to a given activity multiplied
by the worker’s salary. The warehousing costs include both the cost of the central and of the ru-
ral warehouses. The estimation of the costs of renting establishments and of worker salaries was
conducted separately for the in-kind and cash transfers since each modality operated independently.
I thank Carmelita Ventura-Alfaro for several clarifications about the estimation of the program’s
administrative costs.
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for the in-kind transfer against a cash transfer of 160 pesos (since the administrative
costs of a 183 pesos cash transfer would be roughly 23 pesos). Ignoring for sim-
plicity the general equilibrium effects that these policies might have on local prices,
Figure 3 suggests that approximately 62 percent of beneficiaries would prefer to
receive the basket of food instead of a 160 pesos cash transfer.
8 Conclusions
This paper shows how demand systems can be a useful tool to study the welfare
effects of in-kind and cash transfer programs. By building on the theory of virtual
prices developed by Neary and Roberts (1980), the methodology discussed in the
paper allows to conduct welfare analysis using standard demand models derived
from linear budget constraints even in non-standard consumer’s problems in which
budget sets are nonlinear, as it is the case under the provision of an in-kind transfer.
Since this procedure requires the estimation of a demand system using only infor-
mation on pre-program prices and expenditure, it could be a useful tool for policy
makers to conduct ex-ante evaluations of the welfare effects of different transfer
policies and of their relative cost-efficiency.
As an application of this approach, the paper studies an experimental trial in
rural Mexico in which participating villages were randomly assigned to receive ei-
ther a basket of food or a cash transfer of approximately the same cost to the policy
maker. Results suggest that the welfare of in-kind recipients, as measured by their
willingness to pay for the food basket, was on average larger than the welfare of
cash recipients. This (perhaps surprising) result can be explained from two obser-
vations. First, because the prices of the subsidized commodities in recipient villages
were significantly larger than the wholesale prices paid by the government, the face
value of the food basket to a recipient was approximately 37 percent larger than
the purchasing cost of the basket to the government. Second, although the analysis
reveals that there were efficiency losses associated with transferring a food basket
that was extra-marginal to most recipients, the welfare loss was not large enough to
compensate for the larger costs of cash.
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average welfare effects but also their distribution among recipients, another result
of the paper suggest that the PAL in-kind transfer was regressive. Since the com-
modities in the food basket are normal goods for most recipients, welfare losses are
larger at the bottom of the income distribution. This is an important result in the
context of the policy debate since the use of transfers in-kind over cash transfers
is often justified as a mean to achieve self-targeting of recipients. In the context
of the rural villages studied in the PAL program in which program take-up is as
high as 90 percent, self-targeting of recipients is unlikely to occur given that most
of the population is poor and stigma effects are presumably small. In such a case,
extra-marginal transfers in-kind might not be well-targeted as the efficiency losses
are relatively larger among the most vulnerable households.
Because the procedure discussed in the paper allows to compute not only the
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Appendix A: PAL take-up and attrition
Appendix A1 discusses the program take-up and the conditionality requirement (ed-
ucation component). Appendix A2 presents some statistics about attrition.
Appendix A1: Program take-up and the education component
Section 3 briefly discussed that PAL benefits were originally intended to be con-
ditional on the attendance of monthly classes covering topics in hygiene, nutrition
and health. All villages in the cash treatment group and a random half of villages
in the in-kind treatment arm were randomly selected to receive this additional “ed-
ucation component” of the program. In practice, however, the randomization was
confounded and classes were taught also in in-kind villages that were supposedly
randomized-out of the education component. This section documents the extent of
contamination and the the take-up of the program.
All households were asked if they received any transfer from the PAL program,
the periodicity of the delivery and the number of benefits they received. Moreover,
conditional on having received at least one transfer, households were asked about
their attendance to classes, the total number of classes attended and the topics cov-
ered among four possibilities: health, nutrition, hygiene, other topics.30
The first column of Table A1 shows that the percentage of households receiv-
ing at least one transfer was very high in all three treatment arms (CE=cash plus
education; KE=in-kind plus education; K=in-kind without education). However, as
reported in the last two rows of the table, program take-up was significantly higher
for the in-kind sample than for the cash sample. Take-up among households re-
ceiving the cash treatment is around 87%, while it is above 92% for households
in in-kind villages. Moreover, in-kind households also received significantly more
transfers (column 2). The variability in the number of transfers received is due to
the different timing of implementation of the program, with full coverage of eligible
villages that was achieved after one year since the start of the program.
30One additional category refers to classes about the organization of the PAL program. However,
since attendance to this type of classes was a mandatory requirements for all experimental villages,
irrespective of whether they were randomized-in or out of the education component, I exclude them
from the computation of class attendance.
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The next columns show the extent of contamination of the educational compo-
nent. Column 3 reports the percentage of households attending at least one class
while column 4 reports the average number of classes attended (irrespective of the
topic). A few comments are in order. First, 70% of households in the “in-kind with-
out education” group attended at least one class, suggesting that the treatment was
indeed confounded. Second, the program rules envisaged compulsory attendance
to monthly classes. However, the average number of sessions attended (about four
in all treatment groups) was significantly lower than the average number of benefits
received by program recipients. This suggests that the conditionality requirement
was not enforced.
Table A1: Program take-up and contamination
At least
one
transfer
Number
of
transfers
At least
one
class
Number
of
classes
Cash+Education (CE) 0.869 12.210 0.729 4.467
(0.020) (0.431) (0.045) (0.432)
Kind+Education (KE) 0.953 13.564 0.850 4.929
(0.011) (0.373) (0.026) (0.321)
Kind (K) 0.924 13.181 0.710 4.203
(0.015) (0.274) (0.040) (0.430)
H0: CE = KE, p-value 0.000 0.019 0.021 0.392
H0: CE = K, p-value 0.027 0.059 0.750 0.665
H0: KE = K, p-value 0.120 0.409 0.004 0.178
Notes: Data are from the household survey and are self-reported. Standard errors are reported in
parenthesis and are clustered at the village level.
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in the control group, it was significantly lower for households in the three treatment
groups (approximately equal to 10 percent). There are no statistically significant
differences in the attrition rates of the three treatment groups (as reported at the
bottom of Table A2, where I test for differential attrition between one treatment
group and another).
Attrition also caused some change in household composition. In Table A3 I
report the means of demographic characteristics of the household among attriters
and non-attriters. Non-attrited households are larger, the household head is on av-
erage two years older and it is less likely that the household is headed by a woman.
Other variables, such as an indicator for the household being indigenous, the num-
ber of younger children and the total food expenditure (net of self-production), do
not present statistically significant differences.
Table A2: Attrition rates by treatment group
Households Individuals
Cash+Education (CE) -0.039** -0.029
(0.019) (0.018)
Kind+Education (KE) -0.047** -0.045**
(0.018) (0.016)
Kind (K) -0.044** -0.042**
(0.021) (0.021)
Control 0.146*** 0.199***
(0.015) (0.013)
N 6625 30362
H0: CE=K, p value 0.813 0.531
H0: CE=KE, p value 0.598 0.288
H0: K=KE, p value 0.843 0.850
Notes: The table shows attrition rates at the household (column 1) and at the individual level (column
2) by treatment groups (CE=cash plus education; KE=in-kind plus education; K=in-kind without
education). Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the village level. *, **,
*** denote significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level, respectively.
Appendix A2: Attrition
Table A2 shows the attrition rates at the household and at the individual level, sep-
arately for each treatment group. While household attrition was close to 15 percent
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Table A3: Means of selected demographic characteristics for attriters and non-
attriters
Non attriters Attriters Difference N
Number of household members 4.656 4.137 -0.519*** 6691
(2.159) (2.037) (0.120)
Number of children 0-5 years old 0.709 0.723 0.014 6691
(0.893) (0.890) (0.039)
Age of the household head 45.207 42.901 -2.307** 6667
(15.488) (16.482) (0.772)
Indigenous household 0.180 0.232 0.051 6691
(0.385) (0.422) (0.052)
Female head 0.140 0.202 0.062** 6691
(0.347) (0.402) (0.020)
Food expenditure 943.035 924.217 -18.818 6691
(647.519) (654.832) (50.201)
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 show the mean and standard deviations (in parentheses) of demographic
household characteristics for attriters and non-attriters. Column 3 reports the mean difference be-
tween the two groups and, in parentheses, the corresponding standard errors, clustered at the village
level. "Indigenous household" is a dummy equal to one if any member of the household speaks an
indigenous language. Food expenditure does not include the value of self-production. *, **, ***
denote significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level, respectively.
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Appendix B: Sample and variables construction
Appendix B1: Sample construction
The original sample includes 6,707 baseline and 6,063 follow-up households in
208 villages. Two villages were excluded from the program because of violence in
the community, which could have risked enumerators’ safety. As discussed in the
paper, I have further excluded nine villages for various reasons: two localities were
excluded because households started to receive PAL prior to the baseline survey;
two villages refused to participate in the PAL program; two localities were dropped
because all households in these villages received Oportunidades; two localities re-
ceived the wrong treatment (one control village received in-kind transfers and one
village received both cash and in-kind transfers). Finally, as documented in Section
4.2 and in Appendix B2, the construction of commodity prices requires geograph-
ical imputation of missing prices at the municipality or state level. Since in the
sample there is only one village from the state of Quintana Roo, it is infeasible to
construct prices for this village, and it is thus dropped from the analysis.
Within the remaining 197 sample villages, I have further excluded households
with incomplete surveys or in which the household head could not be identified.
Among follow-up households, about 200 of them were classified as “split-off”, i.e.
they were formed by separation from an original baseline household.31 Whenever
possible, both the “original” household and the “split-off” household were surveyed
at follow-up. Since the survey of the latter had many missing modules, I have
dropped the split-off households from the sample, while I do keep the correspond-
ing “original” households. I have also dropped attrited households and surveys with
incomplete food module. Few households were excluded because they had incon-
sistent or non existing information on the household roaster. I have also excluded
households with null food expenditure at baseline or at follow-up. The final esti-
mation sample includes 5,333 households observed in both waves.
31While information on the reason for separation is not reported, inspection of the data reveals
that the most common case consists of adult children leaving the parental household to live indepen-
dently.
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Appendix B2: Store price survey
Out of the 197 sample villages, store prices were collected in 173 baseline villages
and in 192 follow-up villages. A maximum of three stores in each village was sur-
veyed.32 At baseline, in 65 percent of villages one store was surveyed; in 25 percent
of villages two stores were surveyed; and in 10 percent of villages three stores were
surveyed. At follow-up, in 33 percent of villages one store was surveyed; in 48
percent of villages two stores were surveyed; and in 19 percent of villages three
stores were surveyed. On average, 1.4 and 1.9 stores were surveyed at baseline and
at follow-up, respectively.
The follow-up survey collected prices for all the 57 goods included in the analy-
sis, while the baseline survey only collected prices of 34 goods. Even for surveyed
stores, there are considerable missing values: the baseline survey lacks informa-
tion on 22 percent of total village-good observations; the follow-up survey lacks
information on 20 percent of total village-good observations.
Prices were generally reported for fixed quantities (e.g., 200 grams of pasta
soup). When unconventional units were used (e.g., piece of white bread), I have
converted them into kilograms (or liters, for liquids) using the conversion factors
from the INSP.
Appendix B3: Variables construction
Budget shares Data are from household’s seven days recall. For each good in the
analysis, households had to report the quantity consumed, the quantity purchased,
the corresponding expenditure and, if applicable, the quantity self-produced in the
last 7 days. Quantities are usually reported in kilos or liters. When other units of
measurements have been reported (e.g. piece or packet), I have converted quantities
in kilos or liters using conversion factors from the INSP. Expenditure is reported in
Mexican pesos. I have converted weekly quantities and expenditure into monthly
quantities and expenditure, using a conversion factor equal to 4.3.
Expenditure is equal to the reported expenditure plus the value of self produc-
tion. The value of self-production for a given commodity has been imputed as the
32I considered a store to have been surveyed if the price of at least one commodity was collected.
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product between the quantity self-produced and the median village-level price of
that commodity. To construct the expenditure for a food group I have summed the
expenditure of all individual commodities in that group. The budget share for the
group is computed as the ratio between the budget share of the food group and the
total food expenditure (see below).
Total expenditure Total expenditure is the sum of the expenditure on all the 57
commodities considered in the analysis.33 As described above, the expenditure for
a commodity includes the value of self-production; of course, this additional value
is also included in the total food expenditure.
Baseline Prices for individual commodities Baseline prices are constructed from
unit values. A unit value is obtained taking the ratio between the expenditure for a
commodity and the quantity consumed of the commodity. In order to avoid that the
estimated parameters are affected by implausible outliers, baseline prices are equal
to the median unit value in a village if at least 10 percent of unit values are non-
missing. If less than 10 percent of observations are non-missing, I have imputed
the price using the median unit value in the municipality or (if less than 10 percent
of observations at the municipality level are non-missing) the median unit value in
the state. Table B2 shows, for each commodity included in the analysis, the impu-
tation process, i.e. the percentage of villages in which the price was equal to the
median within the village (columns 2 and 6), or the median within the municipality
(columns 3 and 7), or the median within the state (columns 4 and 8).
Follow-up prices for individual commodities Follow-up prices are constructed
from surveys of local shops (see Appendix B2). The price of a given commodity
is equal to the median store price within the village. If the price of a commodity
was missing within a village, I have imputed it using the median price within the
municipality or the median within the state. Table B3 shows, for each commodity
included in the analysis, the imputation process, i.e. the percentage of villages in
which the price was equal to the median within the village (columns 2 and 6), or the
33The list of these goods is reported in Table B1.
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median within the municipality (columns 3 and 7), or the median within the state
(columns 4 and 8). Local store prices were not collected for 5 out of 196 follow-up
villages. I have not imputed a price for these villages and consider them as missing
in the analysis.
Some goods in the store survey present some differences with respect to the
household food consumption survey. First, because of an error in translating the
questionnaire, the price of crackers (“galletas saladas”) was collected instead of
the price of biscuits (“galletas”). I have used the median unit value (constructed
as detailed above) instead of the store price for this commodity. Second, in the
consumption module two pairs of goods (beef and pork; sardines and tuna) were
asked about jointly while they were disaggregated in the price survey. I have used
the aggregated category and taken the median of any food price within the pair.
Prices of food groups The price of a food group (e.g., fruit and vegetables; corn;
etc.) was constructed as the geometric mean of the prices of the individual com-
modities in that food group. Let PJ be the price for food group J. Let pk, k= 1, ...,K
be the price of the k-th individual commodity in food group J. The price index for
food group J is ln(PJ) =
K
∑
k=1
wkln(pk), where wk is the weight of the k-th commod-
ity. The weight for commodity k is constructed taking the state-level budget share
of good k within food group J. In other words, for each commodity in a given
food group, I divide the total expenditure in the state for that commodity by the
total expenditure in the state for that food category. Because the in-kind transfer
might affect the weights by shifting the expenditure towards certain goods, follow-
up state-level weights are constructed separately for the group of villages in the
in-kind treatment arm and for the other villages.
Demographics Demographics included in the estimation of the demand system
are: the number of household members, the number of children 0 to 5 years old, the
age of the household head, the education level (in years) of the household head, an
indicator for the household head being female, an indicator for the household being
indigenous. All variables are self-explanatory except the last one. I have defined a
household to be indigenous if at least one household member reported to speak an
indigenous language.
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Village population The total population in the village is taken from the 2005
Census compiled by the INEGI (the national institute of statistics).
Wealth index The wealth index is the sum of eleven self-reported indicators
about ownership of the following durables: radio, television, video-player, phone,
computer, fridge, washing machine, gas heating, boiler, motorcycle, car.
Table B1: Food groups
Group Group name Food commodities Number
of
goods
1 PAL grains rice, corn flour, pasta soup, cookies,
cereals box
5
2 PAL pulses beans, lentils 2
3 PAL vegetable oil vegetable oil 1
4 PAL meat and dairy canned fish, powdered milk 2
5 Fruit and vegetables tomato, onion, potato, carrot, greens,
pumpkin, chayote, nopales, chile,
guayaba, mandarin, papaya, orange,
banana, apple, lemon, watermelon
17
6 Corn corn tortilla, corn grain 2
7 Wheat white bread, sweet bread, loaf of bread,
wheat flour, oats
5
8 Meat and dairy chicken, beef/pork, fish, eggs, milk,
yogurt, cheese, lard, cold cuts
9
9 Other foods snacks, soft drink, alcohol, coffee, sugar,
mixed fry, chocolate, sweets, mayonnaise,
fruit juice, consome, powdered soft drink,
atole, canned chile
14
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Table B2: Imputation of baseline prices
Good Price equal to
median unit
value in the
village (% of
villages)
Price equal to
median unit
value in the
municipality
(% of
villages)
Price equal to
median unit
value in the
state (% of
villages)
Good Price equal to
median unit
value in the
village (% of
villages)
Price equal to
median unit
value in the
municipality
(% of
villages)
Price equal to
median unit
value in the
state (% of
villages)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 Tomatoes 0.995 0.005 0.000 30 Lentils PAL 0.289 0.041 0.670
2 Onions 0.990 0.010 0.000 31 Oats 0.431 0.071 0.497
3 Potatoes 0.954 0.030 0.015 32 Chicken 0.904 0.030 0.066
4 Carrots 0.528 0.076 0.396 33 Pork/beef meat 0.868 0.056 0.076
5 Lettuce and greens 0.472 0.030 0.497 34 Fish 0.371 0.076 0.553
6 Pumpkin 0.518 0.091 0.391 35 Canned fish PAL 0.680 0.096 0.223
7 Chayote 0.629 0.086 0.284 36 Eggs 0.985 0.005 0.010
8 Nopales 0.112 0.015 0.873 37 Milk 0.848 0.056 0.096
9 Chili peppers 0.838 0.086 0.076 38 Yogurt 0.330 0.051 0.619
10 Guayaba 0.102 0.005 0.893 39 Cheese 0.741 0.056 0.203
11 Mandarin 0.294 0.041 0.665 40 Lard 0.411 0.015 0.574
12 Papaya 0.168 0.030 0.802 41 Processed meats 0.462 0.076 0.462
13 Oranges 0.497 0.102 0.401 42 Powdered milk PAL 0.152 0.036 0.812
14 Banana 0.802 0.056 0.142 43 Snacks 0.086 0.000 0.914
15 Apples 0.548 0.056 0.396 44 Soft drink 0.944 0.041 0.015
16 Lemons 0.335 0.051 0.614 45 Alcohol 0.168 0.020 0.812
17 Watermelon 0.076 0.005 0.919 46 Coffee 0.975 0.000 0.025
18 Corn tortilla 0.650 0.056 0.294 47 Sugar 1.000 0.000 0.000
19 Corn grain 0.756 0.102 0.142 48 Vegetable oil PAL 0.995 0.000 0.005
20 Corn flour PAL 0.386 0.076 0.538 49 Mixed fries 0.203 0.015 0.782
21 White bread 0.660 0.076 0.264 50 Chocolate 0.112 0.000 0.888
22 Sweet bread 0.949 0.030 0.020 51 Sweets 0.543 0.066 0.391
23 Loaf of bread 0.218 0.036 0.746 52 Mayonnaise 0.508 0.041 0.452
24 Wheat flour 0.102 0.000 0.898 53 Fruit juice 0.091 0.020 0.888
25 Pasta soup PAL 1.000 0.000 0.000 54 Consome 0.619 0.071 0.310
26 Rice PAL 1.000 0.000 0.000 55 Powdered soft drink 0.797 0.066 0.137
27 Cookies PAL 0.964 0.015 0.020 56 Atole 0.066 0.005 0.929
28 Cereals box PAL 0.122 0.036 0.843 57 Canned chili 0.680 0.081 0.239
29 Beans PAL 0.964 0.010 0.025
Notes: The table shows, for each commodity included in the analysis, the percentage of villages in which the price was equal to the median unit value within the village (columns 2
and 6), or the median unit value within the municipality (columns 3 and 7), or the median unit value within the state (columns 4 and 8). Columns 1 and 5 reports the goods in the PAL
subsidy.
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Table B3: Imputation of follow-up prices
Good Price equal to
median store
price in the
village (% of
villages)
Price equal to
median store
price in the
municipality
(% of
villages)
Price equal to
median store
price in the
state (% of
villages)
Good Price equal to
median store
price in the
village (% of
villages)
Price equal to
median store
price in the
municipality
(% of
villages)
Price equal to
median store
price in the
state (% of
villages)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 Tomatoes 0.917 0.052 0.031 30 Lentils PAL 0.734 0.115 0.151
2 Onions 0.932 0.036 0.031 31 Oats 0.870 0.063 0.068
3 Potatoes 0.906 0.052 0.042 32 Chicken 0.776 0.141 0.083
4 Carrots 0.766 0.135 0.099 33 Pork/beef meat 0.776 0.125 0.099
5 Lettuce and greens 0.661 0.193 0.146 34 Fish 0.583 0.208 0.208
6 Pumpkin 0.661 0.172 0.167 35 Canned fish PAL 0.990 0.005 0.005
7 Chayote 0.740 0.156 0.104 36 Eggs 0.969 0.021 0.010
8 Nopales 0.354 0.219 0.427 37 Milk 0.849 0.068 0.083
9 Chili peppers 0.839 0.094 0.068 38 Yogurt 0.818 0.094 0.089
10 Guayaba 0.432 0.240 0.328 39 Cheese 0.792 0.104 0.104
11 Mandarin 0.578 0.245 0.177 40 Lard 0.646 0.177 0.177
12 Papaya 0.531 0.234 0.234 41 Processed meats 0.724 0.135 0.141
13 Oranges 0.594 0.203 0.203 42 Powdered milk PAL 0.464 0.219 0.318
14 Banana 0.807 0.135 0.057 43 Snacks 0.755 0.120 0.125
15 Apples 0.760 0.161 0.078 44 Soft drink 0.917 0.026 0.057
16 Lemons 0.708 0.182 0.109 45 Alcohol 0.328 0.219 0.453
17 Watermelon 0.484 0.234 0.281 46 Coffee 0.943 0.021 0.036
18 Corn tortilla 0.760 0.120 0.120 47 Sugar 0.979 0.021 0.000
19 Corn grain 0.792 0.104 0.104 48 Vegetable oil PAL 0.990 0.000 0.010
20 Corn flour PAL 0.818 0.104 0.078 49 Mixed fries 0.891 0.057 0.052
21 White bread 0.682 0.167 0.151 50 Chocolate 0.792 0.104 0.104
22 Sweet bread 0.781 0.120 0.099 51 Sweets 0.948 0.016 0.036
23 Loaf of bread 0.760 0.125 0.115 52 Mayonnaise 0.901 0.063 0.036
24 Wheat flour 0.818 0.083 0.099 53 Fruit juice 0.880 0.089 0.031
25 Pasta soup PAL 1.000 0.000 0.000 54 Consome 0.953 0.036 0.010
26 Rice PAL 0.995 0.005 0.000 55 Powdered soft drink 0.943 0.047 0.010
27 Cookies PAL 0.875 0.063 0.063 56 Atole 0.844 0.089 0.068
28 Cereals box PAL 0.745 0.156 0.099 57 Canned chili 0.964 0.026 0.010
29 Beans PAL 0.964 0.016 0.021
Notes: The table shows, for each commodity included in the analysis, the percentage of villages in which the price was equal to the median store price within the village (columns 2
and 6), or the median store price within the municipality (columns 3 and 7), or the median store price within the state (columns 4 and 8). Columns 1 and 5 reports the goods in the
PAL subsidy. For cookies (good 27) median unit values were used instead of median store prices.
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Appendix C: Additional Results
Appendix C1: Additional summary statistics
Table C1 and Table C2 report respectively the average baseline budget share and the aver-
age baseline price of each commodity used in the analysis. Prices are constructed as the
median unit value in the village.
Table C1: Mean and standard deviation of baseline budget shares
Good Mean SD Good Mean SD
1 Tomatoes 0.040 0.035 30 Lentils PAL 0.003 0.010
2 Onions 0.022 0.021 31 Oats 0.004 0.013
3 Potatoes 0.013 0.021 32 Chicken 0.085 0.088
4 Carrots 0.003 0.009 33 Pork/beef meat 0.040 0.068
5 Lettuce and greens 0.005 0.017 34 Fish 0.025 0.068
6 Pumpkin 0.008 0.023 35 Canned fish PAL 0.010 0.023
7 Chayote 0.010 0.024 36 Eggs 0.037 0.042
8 Nopales 0.003 0.012 37 Milk 0.041 0.075
9 Chili peppers 0.014 0.026 38 Yogurt 0.006 0.022
10 Guayaba 0.004 0.020 39 Cheese 0.019 0.035
11 Mandarin 0.009 0.026 40 Lard 0.006 0.021
12 Papaya 0.004 0.016 41 Processed meats 0.005 0.018
13 Oranges 0.019 0.039 42 Powdered milk PAL 0.022 0.060
14 Banana 0.016 0.028 43 Snacks 0.001 0.009
15 Apples 0.008 0.022 44 Soft drink 0.030 0.051
16 Lemons 0.009 0.017 45 Alcohol 0.008 0.044
17 Watermelon 0.001 0.010 46 Coffee 0.043 0.063
18 Corn tortilla 0.071 0.109 47 Sugar 0.053 0.046
19 Corn grain 0.081 0.120 48 Vegetable oil PAL 0.043 0.036
20 Corn flour PAL 0.012 0.037 49 Mixed fries 0.003 0.011
21 White bread 0.008 0.022 50 Chocolate 0.003 0.014
22 Sweet bread 0.020 0.038 51 Sweets 0.003 0.012
23 Loaf of bread 0.003 0.013 52 Mayonnaise 0.004 0.012
24 Wheat flour 0.001 0.009 53 Fruit juice 0.002 0.012
25 Pasta soup PAL 0.016 0.019 54 Consome 0.003 0.010
26 Rice PAL 0.020 0.023 55 Powdered soft drink 0.005 0.016
27 Cookies PAL 0.018 0.034 56 Atole 0.001 0.006
28 Cereals box PAL 0.005 0.019 57 Canned chili 0.003 0.009
29 Beans PAL 0.065 0.069
Notes: Calculations include the value of home-produced goods, which has been estimated as the product
between the quantity home-produced and the median unit value
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Table C2: Mean and standard deviation of baseline prices
Good Mean SD Good Mean SD
1 Tomatoes 9.32 2.22 30 Lentils PAL 9.81 1.60
2 Onions 9.10 1.38 31 Oats 12.63 3.63
3 Potatoes 9.76 2.00 32 Chicken 24.90 5.49
4 Carrots 8.45 1.96 33 Pork/beef meat 39.67 10.74
5 Lettuce and greens 12.44 3.81 34 Fish 28.66 8.77
6 Pumpkin 8.24 2.45 35 Canned fish PAL 30.77 8.83
7 Chayote 7.85 2.37 36 Eggs 13.89 2.25
8 Nopales 10.42 1.62 37 Milk 54.51 18.91
9 Chili peppers 16.15 6.33 38 Yogurt 25.80 6.73
10 Guayaba 9.61 1.69 39 Cheese 40.82 9.55
11 Mandarin 5.95 1.34 40 Lard 14.37 3.97
12 Papaya 7.24 1.47 41 Processed meats 38.80 8.41
13 Oranges 3.49 1.91 42 Powdered milk PAL 36.16 7.62
14 Banana 5.47 1.19 43 Snacks 45.19 13.94
15 Apples 13.25 2.74 44 Soft drink 7.04 1.34
16 Lemons 6.33 1.67 45 Alcohol 18.27 5.77
17 Watermelon 5.42 0.94 46 Coffee 103.16 76.22
18 Corn tortilla 6.55 1.08 47 Sugar 7.26 0.52
19 Corn grain 2.70 1.09 48 Vegetable oil PAL 11.27 1.27
20 Corn flour PAL 5.21 1.20 49 Mixed fries 66.91 18.19
21 White bread 14.27 3.81 50 Chocolate 43.72 9.84
22 Sweet bread 17.29 7.54 51 Sweets 84.63 32.22
23 Loaf of bread 21.03 7.78 52 Mayonnaise 52.92 13.28
24 Wheat flour 5.44 0.63 53 Fruit juice 13.18 2.49
25 Pasta soup PAL 14.28 1.93 54 Consome 140.41 40.18
26 Rice PAL 6.82 1.73 55 Powdered soft drink 172.28 76.44
27 Cookies PAL 19.15 5.23 56 Atole 60.61 11.83
28 Cereals box PAL 38.34 7.95 57 Canned chili 25.94 6.94
29 Beans PAL 10.33 1.75
Notes: The baseline price is obtained taking the median unit value in a village (or, if this is missing for more
than 10 percent of households in a village, the median unit value in the municipality or in the state). The unit
value is constructed from self-reported household consumption data and is the ratio between the expenditure
for a commodity and the quantity purchased.
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Appendix C2: First stage regressions
Table C3 shows the results of the first stage regressions for the logarithms of total
food expenditure and its square. Estimation is performed by OLS. The instruments
are a wealth index, computed as the sum of 11 indicators measuring ownership of
durables, and its square. The regression also includes all the demographic charac-
teristics of the household used to estimate the demand system and the logarithms of
the prices of the food groups (estimated coefficients for the prices are not shown).
The bottom of the table shows the F statistics from testing the joint significance of
the set of instruments, separately for each equation, and the corresponding p-values.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 70 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1850
Table C3: First stage regression results
ln(x) [ln(x)]2
Wealth index 0.087*** 1.072***
(0.014) (0.162)
Wealth index squared -0.000 0.013
(0.002) (0.021)
Number household members 0.106*** 1.462***
(0.005) (0.061)
Number children 0-5 -0.064*** -0.878***
(0.011) (0.145)
Age head -0.001 -0.008
(0.001) (0.008)
Education head 0.010*** 0.136***
(0.003) (0.034)
Indigenous household -0.073* -1.010**
(0.042) (0.350)
Female head -0.090*** -1.115***
(0.024) (0.308)
Village population -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Guerrero -0.007 -0.008
(0.123) (0.846)
Oaxaca 0.078 1.009*
(0.071) (0.561)
Tabasco -0.172** -2.342***
(0.082) (0.532)
Veracruz -0.113 -1.520***
(0.072) (0.460)
Month survey February 0.002 -0.027
(0.061) (0.601)
Month survey March 0.042 0.617*
(0.046) (0.369)
Month survey April 0.005 0.069
(0.065) (0.453)
Month survey October 0.167** 2.386***
(0.070) (0.420)
Month survey November 0.080* 1.130***
(0.046) (0.319)
Month survey December 0.043 0.607
(0.066) (0.412)
Constant 3.006** -6.414
(0.905) (5.523)
Log prices YES YES
F test 143.4 197.1
p-value 0.000 0.000
N 5333 5333
Notes: The asset index is constructed as the sum of eleven indicators measuring household ownership of durables.
"Indigenous household" is an indicator equal to one if at least one household member speaks an indigenous language.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the village level. *, **, *** denote significance at the
10, 5, 1 percent level, respectively.
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Appendix C3: Parameter estimates and elasticities
Table C4 shows the estimated parameters of the QUAIDS. The demand system
includes the following demographics characteristics of the household: the number
of household members; the number of children 0-5 years old children; the age of
the household head; the education of the household head (in years); an indicator for
the household being indigenous (which is defined by the presence of at least one
household member speaking an indigenous language); an indicator for the head of
the household being female; the total population in the village; indicators for the
state and month of the survey. The terms v1 and v2, reported at the bottom of the
table, indicate the residuals from the first stage regression of, respectively, ln(x)
and [ln(x)]2 on the set of instruments (see Appendix C3). Standard errors have
been computed using a bootstrap estimator which accounts for the clustering of the
errors at the village level.
Tables C5 and C6 reports the full set of estimated Marshallian and Hicksian
price elasticities, respectively. Price elasticities have been computed using equa-
tions (10) and (12) from the paper. Given the estimated standard errors for the
model parameters, which account for clustering at the village level, standard errors
for the elasticities have been computed using the delta method.
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Table C4: Estimated parameters of the QUAIDS
PAL
grains
PAL
pulses
PAL veg.
oil
PAL meat
and dairy
Fruit and
vegetables
Corn Wheat
Meat and
dairy
Other
foods
ln(ppg) 0.004 -0.012 0.013 -0.001 -0.011 -0.017* 0.012** -0.012 0.025***
(0.018) (0.012) (0.010) (0.007) (0.015) (0.009) (0.006) (0.016) (0.009)
ln(ppp) -0.012 -0.040* -0.004 0.012** 0.046*** -0.035*** 0.008 0.060*** -0.036**
(0.012) (0.023) (0.008) (0.006) (0.017) (0.013) (0.008) (0.019) (0.018)
ln(ppv) 0.013 -0.004 0.001 -0.003 0.006 -0.007 0.007 -0.009 -0.003
(0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.011) (0.006)
ln(ppm) -0.001 0.012** -0.003 -0.002 -0.007 0.000 0.001 -0.006 0.007
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.002) (0.008) (0.005)
ln(p f v) -0.011 0.046*** 0.006 -0.007 0.022 0.007 -0.028*** -0.029 -0.005
(0.015) (0.017) (0.009) (0.008) (0.028) (0.015) (0.009) (0.022) (0.016)
ln(pco) -0.017* -0.035*** -0.007 0.000 0.007 0.094*** -0.005 0.022 -0.058***
(0.009) (0.013) (0.006) (0.004) (0.015) (0.033) (0.006) (0.024) (0.013)
ln(pwh) 0.012** 0.008 0.007 0.001 -0.028*** -0.005 0.003 0.004 -0.002
(0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.002) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.011) (0.006)
ln(pme) -0.012 0.060*** -0.009 -0.006 -0.029 0.022 0.004 -0.066* 0.036*
(0.016) (0.019) (0.011) (0.008) (0.022) (0.024) (0.011) (0.039) (0.018)
ln(po f ) 0.025*** -0.036** -0.003 0.007 -0.005 -0.058*** -0.002 0.036* 0.036**
(0.009) (0.018) (0.006) (0.005) (0.016) (0.013) (0.006) (0.018) (0.016)
ln(x) -0.043*** -0.056*** -0.041*** -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 0.018 0.154*** -0.022
(0.012) (0.021) (0.011) (0.006) (0.022) (0.035) (0.017) (0.028) (0.029)
[ln(x)]2 0.009** -0.011 0.007 0.003 0.023*** -0.035*** -0.001 0.013 -0.007
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.002) (0.008) (0.012) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011)
N. hh members 0.003** 0.016*** 0.002** -0.002*** -0.013*** 0.021*** -0.002** -0.032*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002)
N. children 0-5 0.000 -0.004* -0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002 -0.017*** 0.001 0.025*** -0.008***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002)
Age head -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education head -0.001* -0.001*** -0.000** 0.000 0.001** -0.002 0.001*** 0.002* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Indigenous hh -0.006 0.001 -0.012*** -0.001 0.023*** 0.008 -0.010*** -0.004 0.002
(0.005) (0.009) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.015) (0.003) (0.013) (0.008)
Female head 0.004 -0.012*** -0.002 0.002 0.009* -0.017** 0.007*** 0.020** -0.012**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.008) (0.002) (0.009) (0.005)
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Village pop. -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Guerrero -0.008 -0.043*** -0.007 0.000 0.003 -0.025 0.022*** 0.044 0.013
(0.009) (0.016) (0.008) (0.003) (0.016) (0.038) (0.006) (0.031) (0.015)
Oaxaca -0.007 -0.024 0.000 -0.007** 0.038*** -0.002 0.017*** -0.017 0.001
(0.007) (0.017) (0.004) (0.003) (0.013) (0.022) (0.006) (0.023) (0.012)
Tabasco 0.023*** -0.053*** 0.004 0.008** 0.008 -0.103*** 0.007 0.102*** 0.004
(0.008) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.021) (0.005) (0.021) (0.012)
Veracruz 0.006 -0.037*** 0.007* 0.001 0.008 -0.062*** 0.011*** 0.061*** 0.005
(0.006) (0.013) (0.004) (0.003) (0.011) (0.018) (0.003) (0.018) (0.009)
Survey Feb. 0.012 0.024** 0.004 0.002 -0.003 -0.020 0.001 -0.011 -0.008
(0.014) (0.011) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.030) (0.005) (0.027) (0.015)
Survey Mar. -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 0.002 -0.016** 0.000 -0.002 0.011 0.016**
(0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.013) (0.003) (0.015) (0.007)
Survey Apr. -0.012* 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.015 -0.003 -0.010 0.001
(0.007) (0.015) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.027) (0.004) (0.020) (0.009)
Survey Oct. 0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.009*** 0.016 0.007 -0.002 -0.054*** 0.021**
(0.006) (0.013) (0.004) (0.003) (0.010) (0.017) (0.004) (0.019) (0.010)
Survey Nov. 0.005 -0.008 -0.004 0.008*** 0.013** -0.007 -0.004 -0.017 0.016***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.013) (0.003) (0.016) (0.006)
Survey Dec. -0.003 -0.000 -0.005 0.006* 0.031*** -0.015 0.008* -0.021 -0.000
(0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.016) (0.004) (0.018) (0.008)
Constant 0.081*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 0.011 0.217*** 0.330*** -0.021 0.128** 0.057
(0.024) (0.038) (0.017) (0.012) (0.040) (0.062) (0.018) (0.063) (0.036)
v1 0.151*** -0.018 0.057 0.037 0.323*** -0.298 -0.051 0.100 -0.300*
(0.051) (0.112) (0.057) (0.023) (0.100) (0.197) (0.044) (0.140) (0.171)
v2 -0.010*** 0.005 -0.004 -0.003* -0.027*** 0.025* 0.003 -0.014 0.025**
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.014) (0.003) (0.010) (0.013)
Notes: Homogeneity and symmetry have been imposed throughout. ln(pi) is the natural logarithm of the price of food group i; pg=PAL
grains, pp=PAL pulses, pv=PAL vegetable oil, pm=PAL meat and dairy, f v=fruit and vegetables, co=corn, wh=wheat, me=meat and dairy,
o f=other foods. "Indigenous hh" is an indicator equal to one if at least one household member speaks an indigenous language. Standard
errors are reported in parantheses and are computed using a bootstrap estimator accounting for clustering at the village level. 500 replications
of the bootstrap have been used. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level, respectively. The sample includes 5333 baseline
households.
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Table C5: Uncompensated price elasticities
PG PP PV PM FV CO WH ME OF
PG -0.881** -0.120 0.254 -0.023 -0.146 -0.206 0.197** -0.259 0.495***
(0.300) (0.199) (0.167) (0.118) (0.240) (0.158) (0.098) (0.261) (0.147)
PP -0.044 -1.300*** 0.045 0.146** 0.685*** -0.153 0.112 0.758*** -0.218
(0.146) (0.276) (0.093) (0.069) (0.207) (0.155) (0.095) (0.220) (0.213)
PV 0.341 0.037 -0.924*** -0.071 0.193 -0.028 0.152* -0.239 0.036
(0.221) (0.168) (0.252) (0.115) (0.199) (0.137) (0.091) (0.249) (0.132)
PM -0.194 1.073* -0.381 -1.163** -0.802 -0.132 0.053 -0.650 0.546
(0.705) (0.555) (0.529) (0.463) (0.828) (0.410) (0.241) (0.756) (0.498)
FV -0.089 0.213** 0.013 -0.043 -0.916*** -0.044 -0.169** -0.203 -0.092
(0.085) (0.097) (0.053) (0.047) (0.161) (0.091) (0.052) (0.131) (0.096)
CO -0.054 -0.110 -0.005 0.005 0.110 -0.339* -0.017 0.175 -0.215**
(0.052) (0.071) (0.034) (0.023) (0.084) (0.204) (0.033) (0.135) (0.073)
WH 0.303* 0.149 0.162 0.017 -0.896** -0.277 -0.903*** 0.134 -0.174
(0.177) (0.230) (0.123) (0.071) (0.275) (0.182) (0.159) (0.327) (0.183)
ME -0.126** 0.103 -0.102** -0.027 -0.214** -0.108 0.009 -1.272*** -0.011
(0.061) (0.073) (0.045) (0.030) (0.086) (0.097) (0.042) (0.149) (0.076)
OF 0.181*** -0.176 -0.001 0.043 0.003 -0.292*** -0.011 0.234** -0.724***
(0.055) (0.109) (0.036) (0.031) (0.103) (0.086) (0.037) (0.116) (0.103)
Notes: Uncompensated price elasticities are computed at the midpoint of the sample. Standard errors are computed using the delta method.
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level, respectively. PG=PAL grains; PP=PAL pulses; PV=PAL vegetable oil; PM=PAL
meat and dairy; FV=fruit and vegetables; CO=corn; WH=wheat; ME=meat and dairy; OF=other foods.
Table C6: Compensated price elasticities
PG PP PV PM FV CO WH ME OF
PG -0.839** -0.063 0.285* -0.016 -0.026 -0.082 0.221** -0.086 0.606***
(0.299) (0.201) (0.168) (0.117) (0.244) (0.156) (0.098) (0.256) (0.144)
PP -0.046 -1.303*** 0.044 0.146** 0.679*** -0.159 0.111 0.750*** -0.223
(0.146) (0.277) (0.094) (0.069) (0.205) (0.150) (0.095) (0.214) (0.213)
PV 0.371* 0.078 -0.901*** -0.066 0.281 0.063 0.169* -0.113 0.117
(0.221) (0.170) (0.252) (0.115) (0.199) (0.136) (0.092) (0.246) (0.128)
PM -0.095 1.210** -0.305 -1.147** -0.515 0.165 0.109 -0.237 0.814*
(0.705) (0.561) (0.530) (0.463) (0.831) (0.404) (0.242) (0.736) (0.494)
FV -0.009 0.323** 0.075 -0.030 -0.684*** 0.195** -0.124** 0.130 0.123
(0.084) (0.099) (0.053) (0.047) (0.163) (0.091) (0.052) (0.129) (0.095)
CO -0.027 -0.073 0.016 0.009 0.189** -0.258 -0.002 0.288** -0.142*
(0.051) (0.070) (0.034) (0.023) (0.086) (0.195) (0.033) (0.138) (0.073)
WH 0.392** 0.272 0.231* 0.032 -0.637** -0.010 -0.852*** 0.506 0.066
(0.176) (0.237) (0.124) (0.071) (0.277) (0.176) (0.160) (0.314) (0.177)
ME -0.021 0.248*** -0.021 -0.009 0.091 0.207** 0.068 -0.834*** 0.271***
(0.061) (0.075) (0.045) (0.029) (0.090) (0.097) (0.042) (0.149) (0.074)
OF 0.225*** -0.114 0.034 0.050 0.133 -0.158* 0.014 0.420*** -0.604***
(0.055) (0.109) (0.037) (0.031) (0.102) (0.082) (0.037) (0.115) (0.101)
Notes: Compensated price elasticities are computed at the midpoint of the sample. Standard errors are computed using the delta method. *,
**, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent level, respectively. PG=PAL grains; PP=PAL pulses; PV=PAL vegetable oil; PM=PAL
meat and dairy; FV=fruit and vegetables; CO=corn; WH=wheat; ME=meat and dairy; OF=other foods.
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